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Warning! The Manufacturer of This*
Product May Have Engaged in Cover-Ups,
Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case
for Limitless Punitive Awards in Product
Liability Lawsuitst
CYNTHIA R. MABRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages, also called exemplary or vindictive damages,' are "assessed
in addition to compensatory damages [to] .. .punish[] the defendant for
aggravated or outrageous misconduct and to deter the defendant and others from
similar conduct in the future. [This] . .. is an exception to the general rule that
damages are aimed at compensating the victim for his injuries."2
Exemplary awards serve other purposes too. For example, extravagant litigation
costs and inconveniences associated with the litigation process discourage some
injured consumers and users from seeking redress against manufacturers.3 In
comparison to those reluctant individuals, other more aggressive consumers seek
their own personal revenge against companies. The possibility of recovering a
vindictive award encourages claimants-reluctant and aggressive ones-to pursue
legal causes of action against manufacturers.4 More important, punishing
t D 1997 by Cynthia R. Mabry.
* Visiting Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Spring 1997;
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; J.D., 1983, Howard
University School of Law; LL.M., 1996, New York University School of Law. I am very
grateful to Dean Barry Sullivan, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Professor Joyce
McConnell, West Virginia University College of Law, and Professor Doug Rendleman,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, for their comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts.
1. See Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 559 (W. Va. 1992) (quoting Mayer v.
Frobe, 22 S.E. 58 (W. Va. 1895)).
2. Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 570 (Haw. 1989); accord Champagne
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1113 (Conn. 1989) (punitive damages have the
"flavor of punishment"); see Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 455 N.E.2d 142, 152 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa 1994);
Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, 627 A.2d 1081, 1085 (N.J. 1993); Fischer v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 473-74 (N.J. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-12 (5th ed. 1984); Joyce E. McConnell, For Women's
Health: Uncoupling Health Care Reform from Tort Reform, in MAN-MADE MEDICINE 99, 114-
15 (Kary L. Moss ed., 1996); David Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1982). But see KENNETH H.
YORK ET AL., REMEDIES 129 (5th ed. 1992) (noting that there is a lack of proof that the
deterrence objective is actually effective).
3. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 454 (Wis. 1980).
4. See idt; see also Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala. 1989); Tuttle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985) (holding that "[t]he potential for recovering an
exemplary award provides an incentive for private civil enforcement of society's rules against
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outrageous conduct promotes public safety by giving manufacturers the incentive
to scrutinize their own plant operations more closely.' To summarize, "[p]unitive
damages... remain[] the most effective remedy for consumer protection against
defectively designed mass-produced articles."6
In America, ever since punitive damages were assessed for the first time in
1784, there has been an outcry against these awards.7 Today, product
manufacturers are among those lobbying for abolishment of exemplary awards.
Of course, their special interest is narrowly focused on curtailment of punitive
damages in product liability cases. This Article emphasizes the persistent need
for assessment of punitive damages in product liability lawsuits, especially when
a manufacturer conceals information about the dangerousness of its product
knowing that the product causes personal injuries and deaths. The first, second,
and third Parts of the Article focus on the pros and cons of punitive awards from
consumer and manufacturer points of view. Some of the manufacturers'
contentions are weightier than others so they are given more attention. However,
the majority of the courts, including the United States Supreme Court, as
demonstrated in a 1996 opinion, have not been persuaded by manufacturers'
constant arguments against punitive awards.
The fourth Part of this Article presents a sampling of the more egregious and
notorious cover-ups in which manufacturers have engaged. Some high-profile
cover-ups involve businesspeople and attorneys who actively conspire to conceal
known hazards associated with certain products. This kind of conduct, and the
lack of adequate administrative and criminal penalties as alternatives, illustrate
why punitive damages remain essential to fulfilling goals of the tort compensation
system. Finally, in fairness to manufacturers, methods of limiting punitive awards
and protecting manufacturers are offered in the fifth and sixth Parts of the Article.
Despite manufacturers' continuous lobbying for new tort reform, there are enough
serious misconduct"); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Tex.
App. 1996, writ granted); YORK ETAL., supra note 2, at 128 (noting that punitive damages give
consumers the incentive to litigate).
5. See Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (11. 1983); Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 452-53; McConnell, supra note
2, at 116 (arguing that the threat of punitive damages causes corporations to respond).
6. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981).
7. As is the case with many American laws, the punitive damages concept originated in
England. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763). That was in 1763. Twenty-
one years later, in 1784, the first American court awarded punitive damages in a South Carolina
case. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784) (punishing a doctor for a practical
joke-adding Spanish fly to the plaintiff's wine). Fleet & Semple v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky., (13
B. Mon.) 175 219 (1852), was the first product liability case in which punitive damages were
awarded. For more historical information about the origin of punitive damages, see David G.
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1262-64
& nn.17-23 (1976). However, the first punitive award in a product liability case was not
documented until 1852. See Judith C. Glasscock, Emptying the Deep Pocket in Mass Tort
Litigation, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 977, 980, 986 (1987) (indicating that the term "exemplary
awards" was applied for the first time ever in 1763 and in the first product liability case in
1852).
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safeguards already in place to shield manufacturers, when it is appropriate, from
huge and unjust awards.
II. MANUFACTURERS AND CONSUMERS DISAGREE ON THE
NECESSITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
For as long as punitive damages have been available, there has been a vigorous
debate about whether they should be awarded. Most recently, the efficacy of
punitive awards has pitted the President of the United States against the House
of Representatives.8 This section examines arguments for and against these
awards. Some arguments are examined in depth while others are summarized.
A. Punitive Awards Constitute a Windfall to Plaintiffs
The gist of the hue and cry against punitive damages is that compensatory
damages fully compensate plaintiffs for their injuries. Thus, punitive damages
bestow an unfair windfall on claimants.9 Some exemplary awards do far exceed
the plaintiff's actual damages. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 0 a slander-of-title case, the United States Supreme Court upheld a jury
verdict of $10 million in punitive damages-526 times the actual loss the plaintiff
had incurred." Sometimes, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages is markedly disproportionate in product liability cases too. For instance,
8. See 142 CONG. REC. H4425-26 (daily ed. May 6, 1996) (statement of President Clinton
accompanying his veto of the proposed bill for establishing uniform product liability laws).
9. See Froud, 437 N.E.2d at 915 (Sullivan, J., concurring); Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813
S.W.2d 658, 687 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied); Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 454; cf In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (agreeing that punitive damages do represent a windfall for fully compensated
plaintiffs), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). For a more detailed list of
arguments for and against punitive damages, see YORK ET AL, supra note 2, at 127-28.
10. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
11. See id. at 462; accord Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)
(holding that an award of four times the compensatory award "did not cross the line into the
area of constitutional impropriety"); see also Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1383 (3d Cir.)
(declaring that multimillion dollar awards were not unique in products liability cases),
modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Questions Linger on Punitives and
Evidence, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S4 (calling TXO a great decision for plaintiffs).
Other courts have recorded and upheld equally disparate verdicts. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (awarding $6 million punitive
damages and $51,146 compensatory damages); Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911
F.2d 1151, 1153-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming punitive award that was almost seven times the
amount of the compensatory award); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 198 (Colo.
1984) (awarding $6.2 million punitive damages and $600,000 compensatory damages); Tetuan
v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1215, 1239-40 (Kan. 1987) (awarding $1.7 million
compensatory damages and $7.5 million for punitive damages).
Some awards have been less disparate. See, e.g., Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557,
559 (W. Va. 1992) (comparing $40,000 punitive damage award to $66,000 compensatory
award).
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a 1989 district court case survey revealed that in Pennsylvania approved ratios
of punitive awards were as high as eleven times the compensatory award. 2
Still, in light of current statistics, this windfall argument may be one of the
manufacturers' weakest contentions. Three contemporary trends weaken this
assertion: decreasing frequency and size of awards, mandatory caps, and
procedures for diminishing the amount of money plaintiffs receive. Nowadays,
punitive damages rarely are awarded.' 3 Also, the median for exemplary awards
in product liability cases has declined. In one short span of time, the average
exemplary award decreased from $500,000 in 1993 to $260,000 in 1995.14
Furthermore, to avoid excessive overpayment, statutory caps limit punitive
damages to an amount that is commensurate with the compensatory damages
awarded. Usually, the cap is two or three times the amount awarded for the
plaintiffs actual losses. 5 Moreover, in some states, a percentage of the amount
awarded is distributed to a designated state or agency fund.' 6
In May, 1996, the United States Supreme Court announced another way to
reduce the risk of windfalls to claimants. It reviewed a case and offered more
helpful, but incomplete, instruction on evaluating punitive damage awards. The
dispute in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,'7 arose out of a car sale. In 1990,
Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., purchased a $40,750.88 BMW 535i-a luxury sports car
imported from Germany. After Gore drove the BMW for nine months, an
independent detailer informed him that the car had been repainted. Gore sued
BMW of North America, Inc. ("BMW"), the Alabama dealership from which he
12. See Friedman v. F.E. Myers Co., 710 F. Supp. 118, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1989). But see Cash
v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the ratio of
punitive damages to the manufacturer's net worth was approximately one percent); Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with
Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1992) (finding that most punitive awards are
commensurate with compensatory awards).
13. See Rustad, supra note 12, at 36-45 (finding that "punitive damages are rarely
awarded"); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System, And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1254-59 (1992).
14. See Henry J. Reske, Tort Awards Increasing, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 26,26 (indicating
the average exemplary award); accord Saks, supra note 13, at 1258-59; see also AMERICAN
LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 233-35 (1991) [hereinafter
ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILrrY] (citing studies that show the assumption regarding frequent and
severe punitive damages is not supported by actual statistics); Rustad, supra note 12, at 45-49
(reporting results of an empirical study which indicated that when inflation was considered,
"there has been virtually no change in the size of verdicts").
15. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1996) (limiting award to twice the
amount of compensatory awards); FLA. STAT. ANN § 768.73(l)(a) (West 1996) (limiting the
award to three times actual damages ); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (West 1996)
(limiting punitive damages to $100,000 orthe value of actual damages awarded); cf GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f) (1996) (declaring that no limit will be placed on exemplary awards in
product liability cases involving intentional harm).
16. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1996) (allocating half the amount that
exceeds $20,000 to the state treasury).
17. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
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had purchased the car, and the German manufacturer. He alleged fraud and
demanded compensatory and punitive damages."8
Gore discovered that BMW adopted a nationwide policy affecting new cars that
were damaged in transit before they were delivered to a dealer. Under the policy,
cars that needed repairs exceeding three percent of their suggested retail price
were placed in company service and sold as used cars. Cars with repairs that did
not exceed three percent of the retail price were restored and sold as new
vehicles. Typically, refinishing costs exceeded three hundred dollars per
automobile.' BMW did not apprise dealers of this policy. Therefore, individual
BMW buyers were not informed either. °
BMW's estimated $601.37 cost for repainting Gore's car was only one-and-
one-half percent of the manufacturer's suggested retail price. Thus, in accordance
with its seven-year-old policy, BMW did not inform the Birmingham dealer that
acid rain had damaged Gore's automobile while it was en route from Germany.
With the help of a former BMW dealer, Gore estimated that refinished cars
depreciated by ten percent before they were sold. Accordingly, Gore claimed that
he was entitled to $4,000 in compensatory damages-ten percent of the $40,000
purchase price of his car.2
In addition, Gore sought punitive damages. He discovered that in a ten-year
period, BMW had sold nearly 1000 new cars without revealing that repairs had
been made. Fourteen repainted BMWs, including Gore's vehicle, had been sold
in Alabama.' Based upon those national sales, Gore requested punitive damages
that manifested the magnitude and reprehensibility of BMW's fraud on its
customers. Gore contended that since BMW had accumulated a $4 million profit
from its fraud, that profit should be a factor in calculating BMW's fine.
Otherwise, BMW would not be motivated to change its disclosure policy.' So,
Gore decided that $4 million would be an appropriate punitive award. 4
At the trial, BMW based its defense on four arguments. 5 It denied a legal
obligation to disclose minor repairs. It contended that Gore's car was as good as
one that was delivered with original factory paint. It argued that a punitive award
would be inappropriate because BMW had a good faith belief that repainting did
not decrease the value of Gore's BMW. Finally, BMW asserted that sales
practices which it exercised in other jurisdictions were legal and punishment for
conduct outside of Alabama violated the United States Constitution.2 6
18. See id at 1593.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21.See id. &n.1.
22. See id. at 1593.
23. See Brief for Respondent at 7, 16-17, Gore (No. 94-896).
24. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
25. See id
26. See id; Brief for Petitioner at 13-26, Gore (No. 94-896). Despite those arguments at
trial, before the judgment was entered, BMW modified its policy and stopped selling refinished
BMWs in Alabama and two other states. Five days after the Gore verdict, it adopted a
nationwide policy of full disclosure regarding repairs. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1594, 1601 & n.31.
Apparently, Gore's attorney's closing argument at trial was very persuasive. Counsel argued:
"They've taken advantage of nine hundred other people on those cars that were
19971
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At the end of the trial, the jury rendered a verdict in Gore's favor. It decided
that BMW, the German manufacturer, and the Birmingham dealership were liable
to Gore for $4000 in compensatory damages. Additionally, it found that BMW's
repair policy constituted "gross, oppressive or malicious" fraud. Consequently,
BMW and the German manufacturer were liable for punitive damages of $4
million.27 The trial court denied BMW's posttrial motion to vacate the punitive
damages verdict because it did not.deem that award excessive.2"
When the lower court's decision was published, one medical supply company
official described the large punitive award as "a paint job that lead to a snow job
on American justice."29 The verdict set off a string of appeals through state and
federal court systems. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the
lower court's decision except one. It held that the jury erroneously calculated
exemplary damages by multiplying Gore's compensatory damages times the
number of refinished car sales in other jurisdictions. Instead, the court held that
only cars sold in Alabama should have been variables in the equation.3"
Therefore, the court reduced the punitive award to $2 million-an amount that
was "constitutionally reasonable."'"
When BMW appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the Court granted
certiorari "to illuminate 'the character of the standard that will identify
constitutionally excessive awards' of punitive damages."32 In 1993, the Court
already had ruled in TXO that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment places substantive limits on the size of punitive awards.33 Two years
earlier, the Court had ruled that using the common law method to assess
reasonable punitive damages was not a violation of the Due Process Clause when
the jury received adequate guidance in assessing those awards.34 In Gore, the
narrower issue before the Court was "whether a $2 million punitive damages
worth more .... [T]hey have profited some four million dollars on those
automobiles. Four million dollars in profits that they have made that were
wrongfully taken from people. That's wrong, ladies and gentlemen.... You ought
to do something about it.... I ask you to return a verdict of four million dollars
in this case to stop it."
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994) (first two omissions in
original; third omission added) (alteration in original) (quoting Gore's attorney's closing
argument at trial).
27. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1593-94. The dealership did not file an appeal. The Alabama
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the German
manufacturer, so it reversed the lower court's judgment against that defendant. See id. at 1594
n.6.
28. See id. at 1594.
29. 142 CONG. REc. E681-82 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (testimony of Lewis Fuller, President
of the Fuller Medical Company in Alabama).
30. See Gore, 646 So. 2d at 625-28 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 21-22 (1991) and Green Oil Co. v. Homsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)).
31.Id. at 629.
32. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1595 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420
(1994)).
33. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1993).
34. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 11, 18.
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award to the purchaser of [a refinished BMW] exceed[ed] the constitutional
limit.",,,
In its 5-4 opinion,36 the Court reaffirmed previous decisions that acknowledged
the states' province to impose punitive damages when it furthered legitimate
interests in "punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."37 In doing
so, the Court also recognized that the appropriate method of measuring punitive
damages is within state lawmakers' expertise. Consistent with those principles,
the Court ruled that jurors must be instructed to award damages that are
reasonably necessary to protect a particular state's interests." Therefore, the Gore
Court declared that the first part of the analysis regarding excessiveness is to
identify the state's interests in punishing a manufacturer for engaging in certain
activity. Analogously, the Court decided that the State of Alabama, and all other
states, had an interest in protecting their citizens from deceptive trade practices
and in requiring the disclosure of repairs.39
On the other hand, the Court held that under state sovereignty principles, states
"may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of
changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States."4 This means that
although Alabama could promulgate and enforce its own disclosure laws, it
lacked authority to punish BMW for conduct that occurred outside the territorial
boundaries of that state and conduct that otherwise had no impact on Alabama or
Alabamians." Consequently, the Court affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court's
35. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
36. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined him
in a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 1595.
38. See id.
39. See id at 1595-96. The Court noted, however, that states have not uniformly provided
that protection. Although most states require disclosure, there is a wide disparity in the costs
of repair that trigger disclosure. See id at 1596 & n.13 (citing statutes providing "a patchwork
of rules"); see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.03 (West 1996) (requiring disclosure
of repairs costing more than three percent of the suggested retail priced); CAL. VEH. CODE §§
9990, 9991 (West 1996) (requiring disclosure when repairs exceed three percent or $500,
whichever is greater); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-23-4-4 to -5 (West 1996) (requiring disclosure of
repairs costing four percent of the suggested retail price); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.69 (West
1996) (mandating disclosure of repairs costing $3000 or more); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
32:1260 (West 1996) (requiring disclosure when repair costs exceeded six percent); VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-1571 (D) (Michie 1996) (disclosing costs over three percent of the suggested retail
price).
40. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1597; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (limiting
the power of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who are not within the state's
territorial boundaries); Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(describing this theory as "an additional independent limitation on punitive damage awards
flow[ing] from a principle of our federal system that state legislation, state policy, and judicial
development of state law can only be directed at activities within the state").
41. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1597-98. Neither could Alabama legislators attempt to deter
conduct that was legal in other jurisdictions. See id.
1997]
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decision that the punitive award should reflect the interests of "Alabama
consumers, rather than those of the entire Nation.""
After deciding that the State of Alabama held a legitimate interest in the
dispute,43 the Gore Court announced the second phase of the excessiveness
inquiry. It set forth three "guideposts" for ascertaining whether the size of a
punitive award is appropriate: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
act, 2) the disparity between the harm or potential harm which the plaintiff suffers
and the punitive award, and 3) the ratio between the punitive award and other
penalties permitted for comparable misconduct." These criteria were very similar
to factors that the Alabama state court had announced in Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby45 in 1989. The Supreme Court had relied upon similar factors in TXO,46
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,4" and Browning-Ferris Industries,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,48 too. The Gore Court explained each prong of the
test in detail.
1. Degree of Reprehensibility
The Court labeled the degree of reprehensibility as the "most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award... [because] some
wrongs are more blameworthy than others."49 To illustrate, the Court described
specific conduct that it considered reprehensible enough to merit punishment.
Intentional malice, trickery, deceit, and disregard for others' health and safety
depict more serious and culpable misconduct than mere negligence.5" Likewise,
repetitive acts of prohibited conduct that the defendant knows or suspects is
unlawful "would provide relevant support for an argument that strong medicine
is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law."'" Moreover, intentional
economic injury effected by "affirmative acts of misconduct, or ... target[ing]
financially vulnerable [victims], can warrant a substantial penalty."52
42. Id. at 1598. On the other hand, the manufacturer's out-of-state conduct may be relevant
to ascertain the defendant's level of reprehensibility. See id. at 1598 n.21.
43. See id. at 1598. A state must give fair notice of conduct that will draw punishment and
the severity of the penalty that will be imposed. See id.
44. See id. at 1598-99; see also David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions,
Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1994) (calling the "flagrancy of the
misconduct.., the primary consideration").
45. 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989).
46. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp, 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
47. 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991).
48. 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989).
49. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1593, 1599 (1996).
50. See id. (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 453,462,468); accord Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris,
630 So. 2d 1018, 1034-35 (Ala. 1993) (finding reprehensible the refusal of a company to alter
a product in light of the knowledge that consumers were not correctly installing the product,
and as a result were dying or suffering serious injuries).
51. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1599 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 n.28).
52. Id. (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 453).
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Based upon its definition of reprehensibility, the Gore Court decided that
BMW's conduct was not egregious enough to qualify as reprehensible. 3 BMW
reasonably interpreted statutes requiring disclosure of material damage as a safe
harbor. 4 Its failure to disclose was not bad faith. It had not perpetuated
misconduct that had been adjudged illegal in other states. Furthermore, BMW had
not deliberately made false statements, engaged in acts of affirmative misconduct,
or concealed evidence of its misconduct.5
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the jury's determination that BMW had violated
an Alabama statute by suppressing a material fact-that the car had been
refinished. 6 The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act provided that
"[s]uppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to
communicate constitutes fraud."57 Interpreting the statutory language, the
Supreme Court concluded that although suppressing information was less
blameworthy than deliberately making a false statement, it was "sufficiently
reprehensible to give rise to tort liability."58 In spite of that finding, the Court
decided that BMW's conduct did not merit a $2 million punitive award. 9
2. Reasonable Ratio Between Compensatory and Punitive
Damages
The Court's ratio "guidepost" addresses opponents' concerns that exemplary
awards may be unreasonable or excessive as compared to the actual harm the
manufacturer inflicted.' To explain this guidepost, the Court quoted TXO which
held that the proper inquiry is ""'whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the
defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred.""93'
61
Applying this second prong of the analysis to the exemplary award in the lower
court and the actual loss that Gore incurred, the Court concluded that the
Alabama court's reduced award was "breathtaking" and "dramatically greater"
than the awards in Haslip and TXO.62 In the Court's view, the $2 million punitive
award was 500 times the amount of actual harm that Gore sustained.6 3 Thus, the
Alabama jury's award "'raise[d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow."'" The Court
expounded on its ruling by stating that under other circumstances, a higher ratio
53. At the same time, the Court indicated that under other circumstances, economic harm
also could warrant "a substantial penalty." Id.
54. See id. at 1600-01.
55. See id. at 1601.
56. See id.
57. ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993).
58. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1601.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 1602 (emphasis omitted) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21
(1991))).
62. See id. at 1602-03.
63. See id. at 1603.
64. Id. (alteration added) (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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between a compensatory award and a punitive award could be upheld. Examples
of situations which may justify a higher ratio include the following: 1) a
defendant engaged in a "particularly egregious act," 2) the injury inflicted was
not easily detectable, or 3) the monetary value of the noneconomic harm was
difficult to measure. 5
Yet, as it did in Haslip and TXO, the Court declined to announce one precise
formula for calculating punitive damages in all cases. In explanation, the Court
reiterated the position it took in Haslip: ""'We need not, and indeed we cannot,
draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however, that
[a] general concer[n] of reasonableness . . . properly enter[s] into the
constitutional calculus."'' ' 66
3. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct
The third guidepost the Court pronounced was that the exemplary award should
comport with civil or criminal penalties which could be assessed for comparable
misconduct. 67 In making the comparison, courts should give deference to statutory
sanctions regulating the forbidden conduct.68 In relation to BMW's policy, the
comparable state statute was the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The
maximum penalty for suppressing information was only $2000 per violation.6 9
Analogously, the Gore Court decided that the $2 million sanction imposed on
BMW was substantially greater than the fine that was permissible under the
Alabama statute. In the Supreme Court's view, the punitive sanction imposed on
BMW was "tantamount to a severe criminal penalty."70 Moreover, the statutory
language did not give BMW notice that it could be held liable for such a
substantial sum.
71
In summary, as a result of this three-pronged analysis, for the first time in the
history of punitive damages in American courts, the Supreme Court declined to
affirm a punitive award that bestowed a windfall on a plaintiff. The Court
reasoned that "there is no basis for assuming that a more modest sanction would
not have been sufficient to motivate full compliance with the disclosure
requirement."72 It decided that BMW's repainting policy was not sufficiently
injurious to justify the stiff punishment BMW received.7 3 Because the award
65. Id. at 1602.
66. Id. at 1602-03 (omission and alterations in original) (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 458
(quoting Haslip, 499 U:S. at 18)).
67. See id. at 1603. But see Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985) (finding
punitive damages in civil actions can serve to augment criminal law).
68. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1603 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989)).
69. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-11 (b) (1993).
70. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1603.
73. See id. at 1604.
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"transcend[ed] the constitutional limit," the Court reversed the judgment and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.7 4
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from
the majority opinion which Justice Stevens had written.7" The dissenters opined
that the Court should not have intervened. Without addressing whether the
punitive award against BMW was appropriate, the dissenters relied upon the
traditional notion that controlling punitive damages is a matter that has always
been reserved for state domain.76
On a few occasions, before Gore was decided, the Court refused to limit
punitive damages according to a specific formula.77 Consistent with the previous
opinions, the Gore Court correctly declined to set forth a formula. It would be
unfair to potential claimants and defendants if the Court dictated a mathematical
74. Id, Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the denial of BMW's motion
for a new trial if Gore agreed to a remittitur of damages to $50,000. See BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, No. 1920324, 1997 WL 233910, at *8 (Ala. May 9, 1997).
75. See 116 S. Ct. at 1610-14. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined
Justice Stevens's opinion. See id. at 1592. Also, Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring
opinion that Justices O'Connor and Souterjoined. See id. at 1604 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion that Justice Thomas joined. See id. at 1610 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissenting opinion that Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined. See id. at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1610-11, 1614-15. Attorneys also expressed their reactions to the majority
decision. While critiquing the Supreme Court's opinion, Steve Bokat, general counsel for the
United States Chamber of Commerce, proclaimed the opinion as "the victory business has been
waiting for." David G. Savage, Justices Reject Size of Punitive Damage Verdict, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1996, atAl.
When the United States Supreme Court decision was rendered, Pam Liapakis was the
president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. She did not share Bokat's sentiment.
She pointed out that, painstakingly, the Court distinguished economic harm from personal
injury. See Henry J. Reske, Guidelines Instead of Bright Lines, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 36.
"Manufacturers who think this will potentially limit exposures when knowingly marketing
unsafe products that kill or injure can't get away with that." Id at 36; see also Victor Schwartz,
BMW v. Gore: What Does it Mean for the Future, PRODUCT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, July
1996, at 1, 3 (calling the guidelines "a litigator's delight').
Other critics agreed that the opinion would not affect litigants' abilities to collect punitive
damages when there is an injury or death, but complained that the Court should have decided
whether a ceiling should be placed on punitive damages. See Kevin Z. Smith, Lawyers See
Little Change After Court Ruling on Damages, DOMINION POST (Morgantown, W. Va.), May
22, 1996, at IA. The decision has not quelled the debate about how fair punitive awards should
be assessed. See also Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(describing the three guideposts as "the touchstone in evaluating a punitive damage award
under the Constitution"); Editorial, A New Approach to Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 1996, at A16 (declaring that the Court's three guideposts were "common-sense factors for
state courts to weigh in order to keep awards from being arbitrary and overstepping
constitutional bounds"); Linda Greenhouse, For First Time, Justices Reject Punitive Award,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at Al (indicating Gore "has become something of a poster child
of the debate"); Barry Meier, Companies Likely to Seek Federal Court Reviews, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1996, at A19 (quoting defense and plaintiffs' lawyers who disagree on the impact of
the decision).
77. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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application of punitive damages. General mathematical calculations could not
take into consideration how many claimants were injured, the extent of their
injuries, how long the manufacturer knew about the hazard that its product
caused, and particularities regarding how the manufacturer concealed defects and
the personal harm its product caused. These are key factors in determining the
size of punitive awards. "The wrongfulness of a defendant's conduct will
normally be subject to varying assessments depending on the degree to which the
dangers of its product were known at a particular time and the deliberateness of
its conduct in declining to warn or even concealing dangers of which it was
aware."
78
Moreover, some manufacturers' conduct will be more egregious than others
and the level of injury they cause will be more destructive than others. A
mathematical formula could not acknowledge those disparate degrees of
reprehensibility. It is impossible to develop a formula that would encompass the
plethora of variations presented in all product liability disputes.
Each assessment of punitive damages must'be based upon the factf'mder's
weighing of the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, a case-by-case analysis
regarding the propriety of punitive damages is appropriate and a bright line
formula or mathematical calculation is inappropriate. The trier of fact must
determine whether each defendant's conduct justifies levying a punitive award.79
Then, using the Supreme Court's recently announced guideposts, the trier of fact
must award an amount that is sufficient to penalize the defendant and to deter
other manufacturers from engaging in similar conduct, without exceeding
constitutional limitations.
In Gore, the Supreme Court did not address all of the issues surrounding
punitive damages. Admittedly, Gore, the Supreme Court's fourth decision on
punitive damages in recent years, leaves a wide margin on the spectrum between
acceptable awards and unacceptable awards. The Supreme Court still leaves it to
the state courts and the state legislators to close that gap. Needless to say,
litigants will continue to argue this issue in state and federal trial and appellate
courts. On the other hand, the decision does provide much needed guidance for
courts to ascertain whether a manufacturer's conduct merits punitive relief and
whether a particular award is an excessive windfall.
78. Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990); see also
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437,442 (Wis. 1980); cf Victor E. Schwartz & Mark
A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the
Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1365
(1993) (suggesting reform for clearer laws on punitive awards because the purposes have
become blurred and have resulted in skyrocketing awards); Sheila L. Bimbaum & Gary E.
Crawford, Justices May End Confusion on Punitives, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 20
(discussing need for constitutional standards for evaluating punitive damage awards). See
generally Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993) (indicating importance of punitive awards).
79. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 457 (imposing punitive damages "based on a host of facts and
circumstances unique to the particular case"); see also Simpson, 901 F.2d at 280-81 (noting
punitive damages are based on a number of varying assessments of defendant's conduct);
Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 457 (shaping the award to fit the case).
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B. As Punishment for Making One Defective Product,
Manufacturers May Become Liable for Multiple Punitive
Awards
As a result of a few highly publicized cases, manufacturers, their lobbyists, and
their defense counsel have banded together and protested against punitive awards.
Usually, manufacturers and their representatives argue in a choral refrain that
punitive damages should be excluded altogether in mass tort cases."0 They
contend that multiple awards threaten their companies' financial stability."'
The voices of this chorus began in 1967 when Judge Friendly of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals wrote the majority opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc. 2 At trial, Roginsky was one of hundreds of plaintiffs who filed
personal injury claims against Richardson-Merrell, Inc. ("RMI"). Each plaintiff
submitted a demand for relief requesting punitive, as well as compensatory,
damages. Like many others, Roginsky alleged that MER/29, a drug RMI
manufactured, caused him to develop cataracts. He asserted that RMI acted with
such negligence that its conduct constituted irresponsibility, justifying the
imposition of punitive damages. 3 Apparently the jury agreed. It awarded
Roginsky $17,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.8 4
Roginsky's victory celebration was short-lived. On appeal, Judge Friendly
applied a "careful scrutiny" standard and concluded that there was insufficient
proof that RMI had acted with reckless or wanton disregard for consumers' rights.
Therefore, he reasoned, punitive damages were not warranted. 5 Judge Friendly
concluded that although RMI had been careless on several occasions, it had
conducted premarket tests to ensure MER/29's safety. He also noted that two
RMI executives had enough faith in the drug to ingest it themselves. Moreover,
Judge Friendly noted that RMI did not attempt to conceal the unhealthy side
effects of taking MER/29 when that information became available. 6 In dicta,
however, Judge Friendly expressed concern that there were serious consequences
of awarding punitive damages in mass product liability cases. To the delight of
manufacturers everywhere, Judge Friendly declared that he had "the gravest
80. See Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1126 (Conn. 1989)
(noting the defendant's argument that punitive damages are "inappropriate in multi-plaintiff
litigations"). See generally Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 39
n.1 1 (1983) (identifying numerous cases against Johns-Manville Corporation where claimants
were awarded over $3 million in punitive damages).
81. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (stating punitive damages have the potential to financially
cripple defendants), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Neal v.
Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 388 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (offering evidence of over
9500 asbestos lawsuits).
82. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
83. See id. at 838.
84. See id. at 834.
85. See id. at 842-51.
86. See id.
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difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of
actions throughout the nation c[ould] be so administered as to avoid overkill.""7
About thirty years after Roginsky, some advocates of Roginsky still contend that
multiple punitive awards in mass tort cases do present a serious problem.8" One
court explained that "[t]he purpose of punitive damages is to sting, not kill, a
defendant."89 Another court decided that absent tort or constitutional law reform,
"the time will arrive when [a corporation's] liability for punitive damages
imperils its ability to pay compensatory claims and its corporate existence.
Neither the company's innocent shareholders, employees and creditors, nor future
... claimants will benefit from this death by attrition."
90
Several manufacturers have been named in numerous individual lawsuits filed
in different cities across the United States. For example, by 1987, more than
12,000 Dalkon Shield cases had been filed against A.H. Robins Co., Inc.
("Robins"). During a fifteen-year period, eleven punitive damage verdicts totaling
$17,327,005 were issued against Robins. At that time, the largest punitive award
was $7.5 million, and the smallest amount awarded was $5.91 Only sixty-one
percent of the claims settled, leaving nearly 5000 claims for disposition through
trial.
Similarly, many asbestos cases have been and continue to be filed against
asbestos manufacturers. 92 In 1988, Celotex Corporation lamented that 65,000
asbestos cases were pending against it and that complainants were filing new
87. Id. at 839. On the other hand, after he published this edict, Judge Friendly admitted that
there was no basis for his prediction that New York courts would adopt a rule that would
preclude punitive damages in mass tort cases. See id. at 840. Still, although dicta is not law,
Judge Friendly's opinion has been cited by defense attorneys as well as judges. See Champagne
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1126 (Conn. 1989) (noting that Judge Friendly's
statements regarding punitive damages were dicta, not holding).
Perhaps defense counsel so often rely upon Roginsky because punitive damages were not
allowed in that case. However, punitive damages were disallowed in Roginsky not because the
court decided that punitive damages should not be permitted in mass tort litigation, but because
the plaintiff failed to prove that punitive damages were warranted. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at
844.
88. See Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa 1994).
89. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887,
899 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
90. Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1990).
91. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1243-44 (Kan. 1987). In 1987, only
$11 million of those damages had been paid. See id. at 1243; see also Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d
1371, 1388 (3d Cir.) (admitting plaintiffs do not receive all the money awarded), modified, 13
F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993).
92. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
(facing "an apocalypse in the guise of asbestos cases"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 604
A.2d 445 (Md. 1992); see also Delaware Jury Awards $8.2 Million in Damages in 3
Mesothelioma Cases, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Mar. 21, 1997, at 24 (reporting the
award of $1.5 million to each of three plaintiffs); Fifth Circuit OK's Streamlined Claims
Process, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 6, 6 (counting 18,000 claimants from an oil refinery
explosion); Owens Corning Hit With $31 Million Punitive Verdict in Palm Beach, MEALEY'S
LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Jan. 24, 1997, at 19.
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cases at an alarming rate of 16,000 per month.93 Two years later, approximately
90,000 asbestos cases were pending in federal and state courts.94 Product
manufacturers opine that the threat of exemplary awards in situations like those
"create[] ... a serious business risk." 95 They argue that without legislative
intervention each individual plaintiff in mass product liability cases potentially
could recover a substantial award and bankrupt the wealthiest companies. 96
Some manufacturers really are groaning under the weight of bankrupting
awards as unfavorable verdicts severely decrease their cash flow. Conceivably,
one huge verdict could destroy a business.97 However, proponents of punitive
damages usually contend that the bankruptcy allegation is speculative and
exaggerated. In response, corporate representatives point to multiple awards that
act as a catalyst to total depletion of corporate assets.9 Corporate representatives
argue that financial destruction is a present, rather than a speculative, reality. 00
Undaunted, proponents of punitive awards propose another remedy. They assert
93. See King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1033 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting
that Celotex had settled approximately 27,000 more cases for $250 million which amounts to
almost twice Celotex's reported net worth of $149 million).
94. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (Weis, J., dissenting); see also In re Dow Coming Corp., 187
B.R. 919, 921-22 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (indicating that 19,000 individual suits had been filed
against Dow Coming and that the number had risen from 50 to 19,000 in eight years), revd,
103 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1996); Jasmina A. Theodore, Asbestos Litigants Required to File All
Pleadings Electronically, LITIG. NEWS, July 1996, at 2, 2 (counting between 4000 and 5000
asbestos cases in the maritime industry).
95. Susan J. Becker, Attempted Cap on Punitive Damages Continues to Spark Debate,
LInG. NEWS, May 1996, at 3, 6 (quoting attorney Susan Stevens Dunn).
96. See Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1983).
97. See 142 CONG. REc. H4756, H4760 (daily. ed. May 9, 1996) (testimony of
Congressman Meyers of Kansas supporting efforts to override the president's veto of the
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996).
98. "[I]f serious societal difficulties do in fact arise, they can be addressed by less drastic
means than a complete bar to the availability of punitive damages as a matter of law." Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 406 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original);
accord Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 477-78 (N.J. 1986); State ex rel.
Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Or. 1980) (showing that the projected destruction
"did not come to pass"); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 455 (Wis. 1980)
(referring to an argument that bankruptcy was "more theoretical than real"); see Brotherton v.
Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337, 1344 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
99. See Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989) (rejecting
bankruptcy argument); see also Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 564 (W. Va. 1992)
(declining to address the argument that multiple damage awards are fundamentally unfair due
to insufficiency of facts).
100. See Froud, 437 N.E.2d at 914-915 (Sullivan, J., concurring); see also In re Northern
Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(recognizing defendants' finances could be "severely damage[d]"), vacated on other grounds,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); cf id. at 893 (stating that court's calendar would also be
"bankrupt[ed]" by the number of cases).
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that in the unlikely event of actual bankruptcy, the bankruptcy courts could design
a payment plan for compensating injured plaintiffs as well as other creditors. 1
Still, the fact that some companies have initiated bankruptcy proceedings
cannot be ignored. After losing several asbestos lawsuits, and anticipating that it
would be named in 32,000 more lawsuits, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation led
the way by filing a bankruptcy petition on August 26, 1982.12 A few years later,
on August 21, 1985, Robins filed a petition to reorganize. 3 By 1991, an airplane
manufacturing company and fourteen asbestos companies had filed bankruptcy
petitions because of the mammoth number of claims that had been lodged against
them. ' Then, on May 15, 1995, Dow Coming Corporation followed the parade
of companies into the bankruptcy court. Tens of thousands of silicone breast
implant recipients had filed lawsuits against Dow Corning Corporation. 5
It is important to note, however, that a company voluntarily seeks protection
under Chapter 11 16 Furthermore, Chapter 11 status does not mean that a
company is insolvent or in dire financial straits. 7 Robins's postbankruptcy
101. See Man, 728 F. Supp. at 1467; Fischer, 512 A.2d at 480 n.5 (suggesting that
bankruptcy courts could reduce priority for payment of punitive awards); see also YORK ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 136 (stating that "[p]unitive damages ... should survive the defendant's
bankruptcy"); Owen, supra note 7, at 1325 (advising curtailment of punitive damages "once
the bankruptcy of the defendant manufacturer appears to be a real and imminent possibility").
102. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 862 (Iowa 1994). Johns-Manville
emerged from Chapter 11 in 1988 and still had not paid any punitive damages. See id. at 862-
63. In 1983, Johns-Manville had been named as a defendant in more than 11,000 cases. During
reorganization efforts, new claims against Johns-Manville were stayed. See id.; Fischer, 512
A.2d at 477; see also Georgia Sargeant, Third Time's The Charm? Manville Trust
Restructured, TRIAL, Nov. 1994, at 114 (reporting that court approved settlement of thousands
of claims for company with $1.8 billion to $2.2 billion in assets).
103. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1989). At the time, 195,000
individual claims for personal injury had been filed against the corporation. See id. at 697; see
also In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743 (E.D. Va. 1988). See generally Sharon
Youdelman, Note, Strategic Bankruptcies: Class Actions, Classification and the Dalkon Shield
Cases, 7 CARDOzO L. REv. 817, 827 (1986).
104. See Report of the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Mar. 1991), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP., Mar. 14,
1991, at 22,705; Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos
Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 541, 555 (1992); see also 142 CONG. REc. S2341-43
(daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Senator Gorton arguing that Piper Aircraft Co. had gone
bankrupt because of the high number of lawsuits claiming negligence).
105. See, e.g., Lindsey v. O'Brien (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir.
1996); In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 921-22 (E.D. Mich. 1995), rev'd, 103 F.3d
129 (6th Cir. 1996).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
107. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1244 (Kan. 1987) (doubting whether
a company reorganizing under the protection of the bankruptcy court but continuing to reap
millions of dollars in profit was insolvent); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727,
732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Youdelman, supra note 103, at 827 (arguing that Robins was
attempting to force claimants to proceed through bankruptcy court in a de facto class action
since the district court had refused to certify a class action on the punitive damages issue).
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financial status supports this theory. Immediately after Robins filed its petition,
it experienced phenomenal economic growth. 8
In any event, the question remains, "How can a Fortune 500 company, making
annual revenues of billions of dollars, be deterred from placing a dangerous
product on the market[?]"'" In some situations, one punitive damage award may
be enough to encourage a manufacturer to design a safer product or to recall a
defective one. In other cases, it may not. When manufacturers operate with an
indifference toward human safety, for the protection of consumers and users,
continued reliance upon punitive awards, even when prior awards have been
assessed against the manufacturer, is required. Potential bankruptcy should not
preclude a trier of fact from assessing punitive damages when a manufacturer
intentionally endangers human lives. If punitive awards force such companies out
of business, it is good riddance and the public would be much safer.
C. Future Claimants' Ability to Collect Compensatory
A wards May Be Jeopardized
A more compelling argument which corporate defendants make against punitive
damages is that excessive awards in multiple cases threaten a plaintiff's ability
to collect any damages, compensatory or otherwise. Some plaintiffs may not
recoup any compensation, corporate defendants contend, because prior punitive
awards will have depleted the manufacturers' limited funds."' Factually,
however, that argument is flawed. It is the manufacturer's burden to show that
future plaintiffs would be unable to collect compensatory damages from its
depleted coffers. Often, manufacturers have failed to demonstrate that they were
unable to pay compensatory damages. Moreover, empirical studies show that
most injured persons, about eighty-seven percent, do not file claims and that the
remaining percentage of persons who do file are undercompensated."'
108. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1240 (reporting that in 1985, Robins's stock traded at $23 per
share, it had $563,500,000 in net sales in 1983, and its worth in April, 1985 was
$584,798,000); accord Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 480 n.5 (N.J. 1986)
(reducing priority of punitive damages claims in bankruptcy court); see also Youdelman, supra
note 103, at 824 (accusing Robins of implementing a de facto class action by forcing claimants
to pursue their claims through bankruptcy court).
109. 142 CONG. REc. H4758 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Mr. Conyers, ranking
member of the Committee on the Judiciary).
110. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1393-96 (3d Cir.) (Weis, J., dissenting),
-modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403
(5th Cir. 1986); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 282 (D.N.J. 1989);
Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 687 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied). See generally
Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Propriety ofAwarding Punitive Damages to Separate Plaintiffs
Bringing Successive Actions Arising out of Common Incident or Circumstances Against
Common Defendant or Defendants ("One Bite" or "First Comer" Doctrine), 11 A.L.R.4th
1261, 1262 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
111. See Saks, supra note 13, at 1184-85, 1287; cf Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389-90 (rejecting
company's claim that funds were depleted); Jackson, 781 F.2d at 406-07. But see In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (stating court's concern that plaintiffs may be deprived of redress), vacated on other
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D. Lack of Insurance Makes Punitive Awards
Unpredictable
Manufacturers also complain that their inability to insure themselves against
exemplary awards makes them more susceptible to financial destruction. This
assertion is buttressed by the fact that public policy prohibits manufacturers from
insuring themselves against liability for punitive damages arising out of their own
intentional misconduct." 2 Judge Sullivan, in his concurring opinion, suggested
that in light of the unavailability of insurance, the product liability concept should
be reexamined to determine whether initial justifications for awarding punitive
damages still exist. Alternatively, reformists should consider the feasibility of
promulgating statutes to identify appropriate standards for punitive damages,
limit awards, or require payment to a public fund."' Conversely, other advocates
vehemently plead for continuance of the policy against insurance to ensure the
public's protection from unscrupulous manufacturers:
[T]he precise magnitude of cost to the offending party is impossible to
project. This uncertainty of cost will undoubtedly affect a manufacturer's
decision to introduce a product in the marketplace. If punitive damages are
predictably certain, they become just another item in the cost of doing
business, much like other production costs, and thereby induce a reluctance
on the part of the manufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a correctible
defect. 114
grounds, 693 .F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
112. See Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (Sullivan, J.,
concurring), rev 'd on other grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (11. 1983); Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Tex. App. 1996, writ granted) (noting that liability
insurance may be inadequate when the manufacturer sustains several large verdicts); see also
YORK ETAL., supra note 2, at 132 (indicating that insurance carriers do not always pay punitive
damages); Owen, supra note 2, at I I & n.57 (stating that most companies are insured); cf
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 251-52 (indicating that insurance companies
rarely assume responsibility for the type of misconduct that warrants punitive damages and
suggesting that courts should not interfere with the manufacturer's right to contract with an
insurance company); LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PuNinvE DAMAGES §
17.2(C), at 238-46 (3d ed. 1995) (finding that only a minority of jurisdictions prohibit
insurance for punitive damages when intentional misconduct is not involved); McConnell,
supra note 2, at 115 (stating that "liability insurers typically exclude punitive damages from
coverage").
113. See Froud, 437 N.E.2d at 915-16 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
114. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984); accord Germanio v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297, 1302-03 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting that the
indeterminate nature of punitive damages promotes safety); see Man v. Raymark Indus., 728
F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989) (arguing that refusing to limit punitive damages protects
the public from the "coldblooded calculation" to pay claims instead of correcting defects); Neal
v. Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (arguing that punitive damages
"provide a useful function in... deterring product suppliers from making economic decisions
to not remedy the defects"); see also Marcia Coyle, Punitives at Issue, Yet Again, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 29, 1993, at I (reporting on the continuing debate about punitive damages).
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E. Punitive Awards Force Manufacturers to Increase the
Price of Their Products
Some manufacturers warn that their inability to insure themselves against
liability for vindictive awards forces them, through price increases, to pass the
cost of satisfying judgments to innocent consumers."' To stay afloat in the
industry and to pay damages of unpredictable sums, manufacturers argue that
increases in the cost of their products become necessary consequences. As a
result, consumers ultimately pay more for products as companies struggle to
absorb punitive awards and cover litigation expenses." 6
Cost increases are likely in some instances. However, manufacturers will be
unable to raise the price of their products beyond a certain amount because their
charges must remain competitive with other manufacturers' figures. Already,
American manufacturers concede that higher prices make American merchants
less competitive with international traders."' Furthermore, at some level, cost
increases may make the product too expensive for the targeted consumers to
purchase. If the price of the product is higher than consumers are willing to pay,
the manufacturers will lose business anyway.
F. Cessation of Production Should Avert Punitive Awards
In their battle against exemplary awards, manufacturers assert that the future
deterrence objective becomes moot when a manufacturer discontinues its
wrongful conduct or terminates sale of the defective product."' Courts do not
agree that this attempt to mitigate losses, after massive destruction has been done,
should shield manufacturers from punitive damages. The general rule is that,
115. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (Wis. 1980).
116. See 142 CONG. REC at E682 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (testimony of Lewis Fuller,
president of Fuller Medical Company).
117. See id at H4757 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (testimony of Congressman Hyde advocating
passage of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996 in spite of the
president's veto). But see Rustad, supra note 12, at 21 (citing other reasons for American
manufacturers' inability to compete).
118. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1246 (Kan. 1987). The Supreme Court
of Kansas called the suggestion "truly remarkable" but found that punitive damages were
appropriate under the circumstances because A.H. Robins did not recall its product or warn
users and physicians until the Food and Drug Administration ordered it to take the device off
the market. Then, the company continued to sell the remainder of the product to overseas
customers. See id. at 1245-46; see also In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that punitive damages in
one action constitute a reasonable deterrent), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982); Barbara J. Feder, Implant Industry Is Facing Cutback by Top Suppliers, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 25, 1994, at Al (reporting on industry's threat to stop delivering valuable materials for
heart valves because of fear of product liability cases); cf Owen, supra note 2, at 13-14 (stating
that manufacturers could be punished for defective products that were developed under less
stringent standards).
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[t]he element of deterrence is still present in an award of punitive damages
and to suggest that maximum deterrence may have been attained in the past
and that the particular corporate conduct meriting punitive damages may have
been discontinued is no answer in every case where such damages are
sought. "9
If they were not caught, some manufacturers would continue to produce unsafe
products without abatement. Even when the product that is the subject of
litigation is no longer on the market, punitive damages are still necessary to
punish companies that brazenly conceal their misconduct and lie to consumers
about the safety of their product.' Moreover, the second purpose of punitive
damages-deterring others from engaging in the same or similar conduct-is still
justification for assessing punitive damages after a product is recalled.' 2'
G. Attorneys and Courts Receive a Larger Share of
Punitive Awards Than Plaintiffs Receive
Another argument that manufacturers offer is that most of the money they pay
in punitive damages usually goes to the victims' attorneys as compensation for
legal services and to courts for administrative costs. Unfortunately, statistics
support that proposition. One study shows that in the mid-1980s, for each dollar
awarded, plaintiffs received forty-three cents while their attorneys received
twenty cents for legal fees and costs. An additional eighteen cents was allocated
to the defendant's fees and costs and twenty cents more were expended for other
costs. 2 Former Senator Hyde of Illinois testified that plaintiffs "collect less than
half of every dollar spent on the civil justice system."'2 3
Unless a statute, court rule, or contract provides otherwise, litigants are
responsible for payment of their own litigation expenses and attorneys' fees. 4
Generally, in personal injury cases, attorneys and their clients enter into a
contingent-fee agreement in which the attorney will take some fraction, usually
one-third, of the full amount that the client recovers. Absent some overreaching
on the attorney's part or a determination that the fee is either unreasonable or
119. Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1127 (Conn. 1989); see also
Woman Awarded $16.5 Million in Accident Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1997, at D6
(reporting on recent $6.5 million punitive damage award).
120. See Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 826 F.2d 990, 993 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the
manufacturer's argument that punitive damages as a specific deterrent are no longer necessary
because the manufacturer no longer makes products containing asbestos).
121. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1246 (noting A.H. Robins's less-than-commendable reaction
prior to the imposition of punitive damage awards).
122. See generally Saks, supra note 13, at 1283 (concluding that lawyers and insurers are
principal beneficiaries and that "[t]he injury victims themselves take a more modest slice").
123. 142 CONG. REc. H4756 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (testimony of Senator Hyde). Now the
Internal Revenue Service is claiming a piece of the pie too. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117
S. Ct. 452, 454-58 (1996) (holding that punitive damages are taxable under 26 U.S.C. §
104(a)(2) (1988)).
124. See YORK ET AL., supra note 2, at 136; see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1994); FED. R. Civ. P. I I(c)(2), 16(f), 26(g)(3), 37(a)(4), 37(b), 37(c), 37(d), and
37(g).
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excessive, fees should be awarded as the lawyer and the client agreed. 125 On the
other hand, in some cases, class actions for example, courts have begun to reject
bills for exorbitant attorney fees.'26
H. The Potential Liability for Punitive Awards Makes
Manufacturers Leery of Creating New Products and Has
Detrimental Effects on the Larger Community
Some manufacturers also claim that the possibility of having to pay excessive
punitive awards discourages them from creating new products or causes them to
remove lifesaving products from the market.'27 "'Businesses act defensively,
avoid innovation as too risky, and devote enormous numbers of personnel and
resources to litigation."" 2 They say that some of these products, like heart
valves and other medical devices, are invaluable to the consumer. Moreover,
when a product is removed from the market, it has a societal domino effect that
begins with the manufacturer downsizing operations. Next, workers are laid off.
Then, in the final stages, plants are shut down.
29
125. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (A)-(B) (1980)
(requiring reasonable fees as determined by specified factors); ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 14, at 265 (indicating that attorneys receive one-third of the recovery).
126. See generally Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas, 666 N.E.2d 1083 (Ohio 1996)
(suspending an attorney for attempting to collect excessive fees); White v. McBride, 937
S.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Tenn. 1996) (denying compensation based on an excessive contingent-fee
agreement); Henry J. Reske, Two Wins for Class Action Objectors, A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 36,
36 (indicating that judges have awarded far less than the amount of fees lawyers requested in
class actions).
127. See 142 CONG. REC. H4756-57 (daily ed. May 9, 1996); id. at E682 (daily ed. May 1,
1996); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damages in Products Liability: A
Research Report, 3 PRODUCTS LIABILITY L.J., Feb. 1992, at 85, 85.
128. 142 CONG. REc. E681 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (statement of Dick Thomburg quoting
Senator Lieberman).
129. See id at H4758, H4760-61 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (testimony of Mr. Bliley, Chairman
of the Committee on Commerce, to the effect that a 1988 survey indicated that 36% of the
CEOs had reduced production operations, 15% had laid off employees and 8% had closed
factories to avoid product liability lawsuits)
Moreover, some parts suppliers refuse to provide parts for devices or go out of business to
avoid being subjected to joint and several liability with manufacturers for whom they have
produced parts. See id. at H4760-61; id. at E682 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (reporting, through
the testimony of a mother, that three major suppliers had restricted or stopped supplying shunt
manufacturers and that companies are more threatened by multiple lawsuits than outrageous
punitive awards).
At a May 1, 1996 hearing, Lewis Fuller, President of Fuller Medical Company ("Fuller
Medical"), testified. Fuller told House Speaker Newt Gingrich that Fuller Medical stopped
producing baby monitors in 1993 because it could not afford to pay its insurance premiums.
These monitors were used to warn parents that their babies could be dying from Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome. See id. at E681-82.
Fuller Medical terminated its van conversion business, too. Fuller Medical installed hand
controls to enable disabled persons to maneuver vans. Fuller intimated that joint and several
liability principles made his company susceptible to lawsuits involving any design defect in the
van regardless of whether the conversion process was faulty. As a result of Fuller's withdrawal
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Proponents are not advocating needless eradication of companies or their
products. If the products that these manufacturers consider so essential for human
life were manufactured properly, neither producers nor suppliers would have to
be concerned with punitive awards. In such cases, consumers who filed lawsuits
would not be able to prove entitlement to punitive damages and the companies
could continue to offer their unmodified products for sale.
L Manufacturers Consistently Make Three Constitutional
Arguments Against Large and Multiple Punitive Awards
1. Due Process Guarantees of Fairness Are Violated
Manufacturers argue that multiple punitive awards are fundamentally unfair
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 They assert that
multiple awards are tantamount to punishing them thousands of times for a single
act. Thus, manufacturers contend, the Due Process Clause bars further assessment
of punitive damages when an award has already been made for the same
conduct.'
The Supreme Court has not decided whether multiple punitive awards for one
defective product violate the Due Process Clause. However, in analyzing an
Alabama statute for conformance with due process principles, the Court provided
some guidance on the kind of award that is constitutionally acceptable. In
Alabama, juries were instructed to issue an award by considering the gravity of
the manufacturer's wrongdoing and the need to deter others from similar conduct.
As an added safeguard, Alabama verdicts were subject to "meaningful and
adequate" posttrial review.'32 Alabama's common law method of assessing
punitive damages passed constitutional muster. Therefore, according to the Court,
the punitive award that was four times the compensatory award and 200 times the
plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses did not "cross the line to the area of
constitutional impropriety."'33
Lower court rulings are split, but an overwhelming majority have not been
persuaded that multiple awards infringe due process guarantees.' 34 Generally,
of this product, consumers are now deprived of this service. See id. at E682.
130. The Due Process Clause, which was adopted in 1868, forbids states from "mak[ing] or
enforc[ing] any law which shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. See Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir. 1990).
132. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991).
133. Id. at 23-24; cf Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (discussing due process
considerations associated with nonpunitive damages).
134. See Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir.) (refusing to strike repetitive
awards), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); Simpson, 901 F.2d at 280-82; Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 402-07 (5th Cir. 1986); Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F.
Supp. 1461, 1465-68 (D. Haw. 1989); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 284-
87 (D.N.J. 1989); Campbell v. ACandS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1020, 1021-23 (D. Mont. 1989);
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376-78 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Froud v.
Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Il1. App. Ct. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 456 N.E.2d
131 (II1. 1983); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 475-80 (N.J. 1986); Owens-
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their justification is that society is primarily concerned with caring for injured
consumers and protecting them from outrageous conduct instead of a company's
financial status.135 Justice Miller of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia acknowledged the conflicting interests of consumers and manufacturers.
He explained why the law favors awards of punitive damages to each injured
consumer regardless of how many consumers are injured:
[I]t seems highly illogical and unfair for courts to determine at what point
punitive damage awards should cease. Obviously, those plaintiffs whose
cases were heard first would gain the punitive monetary advantage.
Certainly, it would be difficult to determine where the cutoff line should be
drawn as between the first, tenth, or hundredth punitive damage award.
Moreover, because ... trials are held nationwide, it is doubtful that one
state's ruling would necessarily bind other jurisdictions.'36
In several cases, the courts' propensity for rejecting the due process assertion
was based upon a finding that the corporation was not punished for a single act,
as it claimed, but for several negligent or reckless acts committed over an
extended period' Even when there are multiple lawsuits, the manufacturer owes
a separate and distinct duty to each plaintiff to refrain from injurious conduct.
Therefore, each award reflects only the harm that the plaintiff in that particular
lawsuit sustained. It has no bearing on previous or subsequent claims by other
plaintiffs.' 38
Another common due process argument is that standards for awarding punitive
damages are so vague that they contravene due process protections.'39
Manufacturers suggest that nebulous criteria make it difficult for them to discern
which conduct is prohibited. Unconvinced, courts have ruled that the standard for
outrageous conduct (willful, malicious disregard for the plaintiff s safety) gives
Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883, 888-90 (Tex. App. 1996, writ granted);
Keene Corp. v. Kirk, 870 S.W.2d 573, 581-82 (Tex. App. 1993, no writ); Davis v. Celotex
Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 564-66 (W. Va. 1992); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437,
466 (Wis. 1980). But see Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-64
(D.N.J.) (holding that multiple awards of punitive damages for a single course of conduct
violates the Due Process Clause), vacated in part on reconsideration, 718 F. Supp. 1233
(D.N.J. 1989).
135. See generally State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Or. 1980).
136. Davis, 420 S.E.2d at 565-66.
137. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1245 (Kan. 1987) (punishing A.H.
Robins for a series of corporate fraudulent actions spanning a decade).
138. See King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1990); see
also Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385-86 (rejecting claims that asbestos manufacturers have been punished
enough and therefore should not be subject to subsequent compensatory claims); Neal, 548 F.
Supp. at 377-78 (asserting that each tort is "separate and distinct with respect to each individual
plaintiff').
139. See, e.g., Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377 (allowing judges and jurors freedom to decide
without any "legally fixed standards"); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn
Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 108 n.129 (D.S.C. 1979) (rejecting contentions that the doctrine
of punitive damages suffers from an unconstitutional vagueness), aft'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.
1981).
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
manufacturers sufficient notice that if they manufacture products in such a
manner, they may be liable for punitive damages. 40
2. Excessive and Multiple Awards Violate the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments
Manufacturers espouse two additional constitutional arguments based on the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In most products
liability cases, company representatives unsuccessfully, but persistently, invoke
traditional criminal defenses of double jeopardy and excessive fines as reasons
for precluding multiple and large awards. 4' First, manufacturers contend that
multiple punitive awards constitute double jeopardy because they are punished
over and over for the same misconduct.'42 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that no "person [shall] be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."'43 The vast majority
of courts reject this contention and hold that double jeopardy is applicable only
in criminal cases.' 44 One court explained why retaining the option of multiple
awards principles was necessary:
[W]e do not believe that defendants should be relieved of liability for
punitive damages merely because, through outrageous misconduct, they may
140. See, e.g., Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 377 (finding that such a standard provides sufficient
notice).
141. Although they are never successful, these are standard arguments that defendants make
in these cases. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260
(1989); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989); Edwards v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1990); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d
635,640 (Ga. 1993); Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868-69 (Iowa
1994).
142. See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1984);
Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 287 (D.N.J. 1989); Juzwin v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D.N.J.), vacated in part on reconsideration, 718 F.
Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1983); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co., 515 F. Supp. at 108; see also
Continental Casualty File TXO Amicus Briefs, MEALEY'S LmG. REP.: BREAST IMPLANTS, Feb.
8, 1993, at 25 (advocating a "one bite rule"-one award precludes any future awards).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
144. See, e.g., Halper, 490 U.S. at 450-51; Hansen, 734 F.2d at 1042; Man v. Raymark
Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1465 (D. Haw. 1989); Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 287; Juzwin, 705
F. Supp. at 1059; Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co., 515 F. Supp. at 108 n.129; Champagne
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1126-27 (Conn. 1989); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494
A.2d 1353, 1357-58 (Me. 1985) (distinguishing punitive awards for "private wrong[s]" from
criminal prosecution-an action "brought solely on the behalf of the public"); see also
Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 687 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied) (deciding that
there is no violation of due process).
Still, the Supreme Court has not determined whether due process law limits multiple
exemplary awards in mass-tort litigation. Although lower courts have expressed concern about
the ultimate consequences of these awards, the majority of them have decided against striking
an award solely because it was geared to assess punishment for the same conduct. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir.), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); accord
Keene Corp. v. Kirk, 870 S.W.2d 573, 581-82 (Tex. App. 1993, no writ).
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have managed to seriously injure a large number of persons. Such a rule
would encourage wrongdoers to continue their misconduct, because if they
kept it up long enough to injure a large number of people, they could escape
all liability for punitive damages.
145
Manufacturers further urge lawmakers to control large awards because they are
inconsistent with and unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.'46 Manufacturers claim that large awards are
incongruous with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against imposing
"[e]xcessive bail" and "excessive fines.' 47 On the contrary, just as they decided
the due process issue in the consumers' favor, courts have held that the framers
of the Eighth Amendment did not intend for it to shield manufacturers from
assessment of punitive damages in civil disputes. Rather, "'[n]ot only the
connotation of the words "bail," and "fine," but the legislative history concerning
enactment of the bill of rights supports an argument that the Eighth Amendment
was intended to be applied only to punishment invoked as a sanction for criminal
conduct."" 48
Neither of these constitutional provisions forbids assessment of punitive awards
to claimants in civil cases. Repeatedly, courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have held that punitive damages are intended to penalize
wrongdoers. However, manufacturers improperly compare these awards with
punishment that comes under the auspices of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
Double jeopardy and excessive fines safeguards are reserved exclusively for
criminal proceedings. Thus, multiple and excessive punitive damage awards in
civil lawsuits do not violate double jeopardy and excessive fines proscriptions.'
49
145. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (emphasis in
original), rev'd on other grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (11. 1983); accord Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 405 (5th Cir. 1986); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985); Man, 728 F. Supp. at 1467-68; State ex rel. Young
v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Or. 1980).
146. See, e.g., King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1990);
Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1059; Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co., 515 F. Supp. at 108.
147. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
148. Electro Servs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524, 1530 (1Ith Cir. 1988) (quoting
Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also McCleary v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 913 F.2d 257, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying state constitutional claim
of excessive fine).
149. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989);
accord King, 906 F.2d at 1030-31; Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1989);
Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 286-87; Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 1984)
(refusing to apply "traditional safeguards" to civil proceedings); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co.,
738 P.2d 1210, 1245-46 (Kan. 1987); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d
196, 206 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); cf. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that "a defendant in a civil action
has a right to be protected against double recoveries not because it violates 'double jeopardy'
but simpy because overlapping damage awards violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness'),
vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
Although Fifth Circuit judges agreed with the Supreme Court, they were reluctant to do so:
We have misgivings, however, because we are acutely conscious of the prophetic
words Judge Henry Friendly used twenty-three years ago: "The legal difficulties
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Among other things, judges and jurors must balance competing interests when
they are determining whether punitive damages should be awarded. They must
weigh the injured consumers' or users' interest in safety against the
manufacturers' interests in maintaining a thriving and profitable business.
Sometimes, for safety's sake, the individual-consumers'/users' rights must
outweigh the manufacturers' interests.
III. DEFINITIONS OF PUNISHABLE CONDUCT AND FACTORS
FOR QUANTIFYING DAMAGES VARY FROM STATE TO STATE
AND FROM COURT TO COURT
Although plaintiffs have no constitutional entitlement to exemplary awards,
they do have a right to seek that relief. 5 Contrary to popular belief, however,
punitive damages are not recovered in every case in which they are sought.'
Actually, statistics show that in product liability lawsuits punitive damages are
awarded in a minuscule number of cases-only two percent.'52 That is, in only
approximately fourteen cases per year do plaintiffs recover exemplary awards.'53
The number of punitive awards is de minimis because these awards are
engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part of hundreds of plaintiffs
are staggering.... We have the greatest difficulty in perceiving how claims for
punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be
so administered as to avoid overkill."
King, 906 F.2d at 1033 (omission in original) (quoting Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967)).
150. Jackson, 781 F.2d at 404 (ensuring awards in egregious cases only); In re Dalkon
Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898 & n.37 (concluding that there is no right to punitive damages);
Mack Trucks, Inc., v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 638 (Ga. 1993); Masaki v. General Motors
Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 570 (Haw. 1989) (awarding punitive damages "only when egregious
nature of defendant's conduct makes such a remedy appropriate").
15 1. See, e.g., Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 850-51 (denying recovery of punitive damages because
plaintiff did not show reckless disregard for human safety); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Ford, 461 S.E.2d 877, 883-84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no evidence to support a punitive
award); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Wis. 1980) (stating that punitive
damages are not recoverable for mere negligence); see also Occidental Not Liable for Love
Canal, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1994, at A8 (reporting that plaintiffs' failure to prove reckless
disregard for safety resulted in no recovery of punitive damages).
152. See, e.g., In re Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 892 (mentioning infrequent but
prevalent punitive awards); Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 456 (acknowledging the number of cases
in which punitive damages are imposed is insubstantial); Owen, supra note 2, at 10 & n.49
(indicating defendants won 50-75% of these cases); see also 142 CONG. REC. H4761 (daily ed.
May 9, 1996) (testimony of Congressman Watt against overriding the president's veto, and
denying the existence of a "litigation explosion" in product liability cases). See generally
Rustad, supra note 12, 24-37.
153. See 142 CONG. REc. H4758 (daily ed. May 9, 1996); see also Larry S. Stewart, Damage
Caps Will Hurt Injured Consumers, TRIAL, Dec. 1994, at 68, 69 (citing studies finding that
only 355 punitive damage awards were made in products liability cases between 1965 and
1990).
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permissible only when the claimant proves that the defendant manufacturer
engaged in conduct that is punishable under applicable state law.'54
To determine whether punitive awards are warranted, states apply similar, but
somewhat divergent standards. Customarily, something more than mere
negligence is necessary to support an award, but the degree of contumacious
conduct that would justify an exemplary award varies from state to state.
Generally, the standards fit into one of three categories: "malice-only," "malice
or reckless disregard," and "gross negligence."' 55 Most states, however, require
proof of some kind of willful misconduct such as fraud, oppression, malice, or
wantonness. 156
The manufacturer's lack of regard for human safety is seriously considered in
many states. Ohio legislators, for example, require proof of "flagrant disregard"
for the safety of persons who may be harmed by the product,5 7 while Connecticut
and Oklahoma legislators mandate that fact finders look for evidence of "reckless
disregard" for human safety. 5 In comparison, Minnesota legislators established
a standard of "deliberate disregard" for the safety of others.'59 Finally, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts's definition encompasses some of the terms that
appear in state statutes. Its description includes adjectives like "outrageous,"
"evil," and "reckless indifference" for discerning whether a manufacturer's
conduct merits punitive relief.
61
In states where the legislature has not promulgated detailed criteria for
assessing punitive awards, judges have set the standard. At the time the TXO case
was tried in the West-Virginia state court system, West Virginia judges had been
applying a "reasonable relationship" standard. That is, exemplary damages had
to be reasonably related to the actual damages or harm the defendant inflicted. 6'
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Justice
Neeley announced a nontraditional standard. He placed defendants in three
categories: "really stupid," "really mean," and "really stupid defendants who
could have caused a great deal of harm by their actions but who actually caused
154. See, e.g., Jackson, 781 F.2d at 408.
155. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (announcing an "evil motive or
intent," or a "reckless or callous indifference" standard); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353,
1361 (Me. 1985) (announcing a "malice-only" standard); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 934
S.W.2d 439, 448 (Tex. App. 1996, n.w.h.) (applying a gross negligence standard).
156. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring "oppression, fraud,
or malice"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West 1996) (including "gross misconduct" as
another consideration); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5. 1 (b) (Supp. 1997) (adding "entire want of
care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences" as a
factor); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) (setting a standard of "deliberate
disregard for the rights or safety of others").
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.801(A) (Anderson Supp. 1996); see also Owen, supra
note 2, at 21 (concluding that "flagrant indifference to the public safety" is a proper standard).
158. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)
(West Supp. 1997).
159. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1)(a).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
161. See Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 908 (W. Va. 1991) (establishing
the reasonable relationship standard).
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minimal harm."'62 Analyzing the verdict in TXO, Justice Neeley concluded that
a large award was needed "to deter future evil acts by ['really mean']
defendants."' 63 When the verdict was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, Justice O'Connor lambasted Justice Neeley for his "cavalier standards
[because] so much [was] at stake."' 64
A court in the State of Maine announced a standard different from the norm.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine renounced the reckless disregard standard
as too vague and uncertain for proper measurement of punitive awards.'65 The
court reasoned that the reckless standard "overextends the availability of punitive
damages, and dulls the potentially keen edge of the doctrine as an effective
deterrent of truly reprehensible conduct."' 66
In place of the reckless disregard standard, the Maine court held the proper
standard for determining punitive damages awards was based on an analysis of
the express or implied malicious conduct of defendants. After analyzing
precedent in several Maine cases where punitive awards were upheld, the court
discerned that malice was a "common thread" among the rulings.'67 The court
went on to describe the kind of malicious conduct that would support punitive
awards inMaine. If the defendant acted with ill will toward the plaintiff when it
engaged in tortious activity, malice existed. Moreover, the court recognized that,
in some instances, the defendant's deliberate conduct could be so outrageous that
malice should be implied.'.
Over the years, judges, through their opinions, and legislators, through statutes,
have enumerated other considerations for punitive damage awards. Criteria have
been listed to assist judges and jurors in making determinations regarding the size
of punitive damage awards. These elements, some of which are listed in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, include:
(1) the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong committed;
(2) the manufacturer's knowledge of the hazard;
(3) the amount of profit the manufacturer acquired from its misconduct;
(4) the circumstances surrounding the transaction;
(5) the manufacturer's wealth;
(6) the manufacturer's scienter;
162. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887-88 (W. Va. 1992),
affd, 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
163. Id. at 889.
164. TXO, 509 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Me. 1985) (finding reckless disregard
standard too broad).
166. Id. at 1361.
167. Id. at 1361-62.
168. See id. (deciding the evidence did not meet new standard because there was no evidence
of malice, either express or implied); cf Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d
242, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (inferring malice from the defendant's wanton conduct).
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(7) the actual damages recovered;
(8) the date that the misconduct was terminated; and,
(9) the effect and severity of other punishment the manufacturer either
received or could receive.169
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and at least nine states require consideration
of whether the manufacturer intentionally concealed a known danger and the
manufacturer's attitude when the cover-up was detected. In California, Kansas,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and West Virginia,
the factfinder may assess punitive damages based on a manufacturer's
concealment. 70 Similarly, in three punitive damages decisions, the Supreme
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt e (1979); see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3702(b) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.186(2) (Michie 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 549.20(3) (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(e) (1996); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
2307.80(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(A) (West 1996); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991); Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371, 1384
(3d Cir.) (considering ability to pay), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); Spaur v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 867 (Iowa 1994); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738
P.2d 1210, 1238-39 (Kan. 1987); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883,
889-92 (Tex. App. 1996, writ granted) (applying these factors to conclude that the punitive
award was constitutional); see also Janssens, 463 So. 2d at 247-48; Davis v. Celotex Corp.,
420 S.E.2d 557, 559-60 (W. Va. 1992); Owen, supra note 7, at 1314-19.
According to the Restatement, the following factors should be considered in making the
determination to award punitive damages: (1) the act itself, including the motives of the
wrongdoer, the relations between the parties, and provocation or want of provocation; (2) the
extent of harm to the injured person, including the expense to which plaintiff has been put in
bringing a lawsuit; (3) the wealth of the defendant; and (4) the existence of multiple claims.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt e.
In Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989), another famous punitive damages
case, the Alabama Supreme Court listed seven factors for ascertaining whether punitive awards
were appropriate in Alabama product liability cases. First, a reasonable relationship must exist
between the harm the manufacturer's conduct was likely to cause and the harm that actually
occurred. Second, the award should reflect the degree of reprehensibility of the manufacturer's
conduct. Third, to ensure that the manufacturer suffered a loss, the award had to exceed the
manufacturer's profit. Fourth, in doing the economic analysis, the manufacturer's financial
status had to be considered. Fifth, the extent of the manufacturer's litigation costs was weighed.
The sixth and seventh considerations were mitigation factors: (1) whether criminal sanctions
had been imposed against the manufacturer, and (2) whether other civil actions against the
same manufacturer for the same conduct had been filed. See id. at 223-24; see also BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1605-09 (1996) (Breyer, O'Connor, Souter, JJ.,
concurring) (analyzing the Alabama standard for constraining punitive awards); Alley v.
Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 40 (D. Colo. 1983) (stating factors which Colorado courts
consider to determine if punitive damage awards are excessive); Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus,
616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981) (reciting the State of Texas's criteria).
170. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(c)(3) (West 1996) (defining fraud to include
purposeful concealment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(4) (1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
411.186(2)(d) (Michie 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 1996) (including
consideration of the number of employees involved in the cover-up); Miss. CODEANN. § 11-1-
65(l)(f)(ii)(2) (1996); OHIOREv. CODEANN. § 2307.801(B)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(A) (West 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.925(3)(d) (1995); Games v.
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Court deemed concealment punishable conduct. In Haslip, the Supreme Court
included concealment as a factor to consider in awarding punitive damages."'
The Gore Court mentioned concealment as conduct that is reprehensible enough
to justify punitive liability.'72 Also, in TXO, deceit, a similar factor, was among
the elements the Court considered. 73
State legislators have delineated standards for punitive damages and factors for
valuing punitive damages. The Gore decision holds that in making determinations
regarding punitive damages, decisionmakers should consider only three factors.
Although those factors are important considerations, the Supreme Court left out
essential elements which state courts and legislators have relied upon for fair
assessments of these awards. Because the Supreme Court's three-part analysis in
Gore does not consider essential factors enumerated in statutes, litigation
regarding how punitive damages are quantified will continue.
IV. PUNITIVE AWARDS STILL SERVE SOCIETAL NEEDS FOR
PROTECTING INNOCENT CONSUMERS FROM
UNSCRUPULOUS MANUFACTURERS
Consumers and consumer advocates urge continuation of punitive damages
because without unlimited potential liability for such awards, many corporations
would manufacture unsafe products with reckless abandonment. 74 Some
manufacturers consistently operate in such a careless manner that something more
than a sting is needed to deter future wrongdoing. Under those extreme
circumstances, exemplary awards serve a great societal need.'75
Manufacturers should be put on notice that they may pay a high penalty if they
conceal the dangerousness of a product when they know the products are injuring
and killing people. In each instance, the punitive award should be commensurate
with the length of concealment, the particular circumstances surrounding the
Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991) (inviting jury to consider whether
the defendant concealed or attempted to conceal its actions or the harm caused).
171. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22.
172. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1601.
173. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
174. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (Ct App. 1981) (concluding
that punitive damages provide "the most effective remedy for consumer protection"); Owen,
supra note 2, at 15 (noting that supporters believe punitive damages are "an important bulwark
to protect the public from manufacturers who are too powerful to fear any other penalty");
Becker, supra note 95, at 6 (quoting Susan Stevens Dunn, co-chair of the Products Liability
Litigation Committee of the ABA Section on Litigation).
175. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986); Froud
v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 915 (II. App. Ct. 1982) (Sullivan, J., concurring), rev'd on
other grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (111. 1983); see also Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 455
N.E.2d 142, 145, 152 (Ill. 1983) (holding that failure to install proper guard on conveyor belt
despite corporate knowledge that it would prevent serious injury to Litton employees precluded
summary judgment on issue of punitive damages); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d
437, 462 (Wis. 1980) (holding that allegations of corporate knowledge about car defects before
manufacture and about serious injuries after manufacture were sufficient to state a claim for
punitive damages).
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concealment, and the extent and number of injuries and deaths occurring from the
first day of concealment through judgment. When manufacturers have engaged
in repetitive and purposeful concealment, multiple and huge civil penalties should
be assessed.
It has been suggested that, "the flagrancy of [a manufacturer's] misconduct is
... the primary consideration in determining the amount of punitive damages.""7
Several examples of the kind of flagrant deceitfulness and concealment of hazards
which merit assessment of punitive awards have been documented. This Part
highlights some incidents that demonstrate why continuation of punitive awards
is necessary to protect the public from conscienceless manufacturers.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc. ("Robins") purposely caused serious and permanent
injuries to millions of women who used its Dalkon Shield-an intrauterine
contraceptive device designed to prevent pregnancy. Robins intentionally and
knowingly concealed unequivocal evidence that its product was not as safe as
Robins steadfastly represented. From the beginning, Robins demonstrated its
disregard for women's safety when it marketed the Dalkon Shield without testing
it to ensure its safety for human use.'7 7
Then, Robins altered the original design and an internal memorandum showed
that Robins intentionally withheld information about those changes. This was
noteworthy because Robins marketed the Dalkon Shield using a questionable
study that was performed on one of the original, unchanged devices.' The study
Robins publicized indicated that women who used the Dalkon Shield had an
extremely low pregnancy rate of 1.1%.179 One year after Robins began to sell the
device, doctors who prescribed it for their patients informed Robins that it was
not as effective as Robins had indicated earlier. The actual pregnancy rate was
believed to be around 7-8%-much higher than 1.1%. 80
Physicians notified Robins that many of their patients had become seriously ill
while using the Dalkon Shield. Robins's executives ignored the doctors' evidence
that the Dalkon Shield caused unwanted pregnancies, septic abortions, severe
pelvic infections, excruciating pain, and several deaths.' Thousands of women
needed hysterectomies to cure or relieve chronic side effects.' Despite its
knowledge, Robins callously continued sales and advertising without correcting
176. Owen, supra note 4, at 363, 387.
177. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Kan. 1987).
178. See id. at 1218; see also RiCHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THELAW 22 (1991) (stating that
Robins concealed the change to avoid the Food and Drug Administration's requirement that
Robins prove the product's safety before marketing it).
179. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1218.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 1218-20 (quoting correspondence from physicians across the nation about
their patients' conditions because of the Dalkon Shield); see also SOBOL, supra note 178, at
7-9, 11, 22 (describing the lack of efficacy and the illness the Dalkon Shield caused).
182. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1215-20 (recounting different side effects of Dalkon Shield).
The plaintiff in Tetuan had surgery including a complete removal of her uterus, Fallopian
tubes, and ovaries. The operation made her feel less than a woman. In addition, she was
required to take synthetic hormones for the rest of her life. The seriously dangerous side effects
of the hormones were: cancer, liver disorder, gall bladder disease, and blood clotting. See id.
at 1216.
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defects in the product or warning women and their physicians about potential
problems.' One federal court concluded there was evidence of "a pervasive
picture of covering up a defective product and continuing to merchandise it by
misrepresenting both its efficacy and its safety.'
' 84
Not only did Robins fraudulently mislead millions of women who used its
product, it also deceived doctors by assuring them the device was safe.'85 Despite
painful episodes of serious illness, Loretta Tetuan followed her physician's
advice and kept a Dalkon Shield in her body from 1971 until 1980.186 After she
sued Robins, the Supreme Court of Kansas decided there was sufficient evidence
of Robins's fraud on Dalkon Shield customers and physicians. It affirmed the jury
verdict of $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million in punitive
damages.8
7
Robins's officials were stubborn. They defied one physician's recommendation
to withdraw the Dalkon Shield from the market in 1972.'8' Two years later, the
United States Food and Drug Administration ordered Robins to suspend
distribution." 9 Still, it took Robins six more years to advise doctors to remove its
product from women displaying asymptomatic signs.'o Even after Robins ceased
distribution, it failed to prevent further injury to women who still had the device
implanted in their bodies. It refused to recall the product.' This is a persuasive
example to support the argument that withdrawal of a product should not preclude
assessment of punitive awards against the manufacturer.
The Robins cover-up regarding the Dalkon Shield had been implemented years
before cessation of production. Roger Tuttle, a Robins attorney in charge of
product liability cases, testified that in 1975, Chief Counsel Forrest ordered him
to find and destroy documents which memorialized deficiencies in the Dalkon
183. See idl 1218-20; SOBOL, supra note 178, at 7 (discussing Robins's ignorance of "danger
signs"). When evidence was publicized that Robins ignored information that its intrauterine
device caused serious infections, congressional sponsors for tort reform withdrew their support
for pending legislation. See also PEER H. SCHUCK, TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 257
(1991).
184. Craig v. A.H. Robins Co., 790 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting Robins's argument
that evidence regarding the Dalkon Shield's pregnancy rate was irrelevant).
185. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1228-29. The court ruled that "where a patient relies on a
physician for treatment or advice as to an ethical or prescription device, justifiable reliance by
the physician on misrepresentations or concealment by the manufacturer of that device
constitutes justifiable reliance by the patient." Id. at 1228.
186. See id. at 1215-16. The court noted that Ms. Tetuan had relied upon Robins's
"malicious silence" about the true nature of its product. Id. at 1228.
187. See id. at 1240 (listing Robins's fraudulent acts including "consign[ing] hundreds of
documents to the furnace rather than inform women that the Dalkon Shield carried inside their
bodies was a bacterial time bomb which could cause septic abortions, PID, and even death").
188. See id. at 1219 (noting physician's recommendations to Robins to test, amend
advertising, provide cautionary statements to physicians, and withdraw the product).
189. See id. at 1220.
190. See id. at 1220-21.
191. See SOBOL, supra note 178, at 11 (surmising that approximately three million women
continued to rely upon the device).
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Shield.' 92 Forrest informed Tuttle that he had discussed the plan for document
destruction with W.L. Zimmer, III, Robins's president. Forrest blamed Tuttle "for
allowing [a] memorandum ... to-come to light in the [first case that was tried
against Robins]. Forrest... did not ever want anything like that to happen again,
and the only way to ensure that was if the documents no longer existed."' 93 Tuttle,
who secretly retained some of the documents which he was supposed to have
eliminated, received confirmation that hundreds of documents were burned in a
furnace.'94
Another shocking concealment implicates the entire asbestos industry. Asbestos
manufacturers concealed the dangers of asbestos for at least four decades.
Ruthlessly, they deceived people, including their own employees, and secreted
information about dangerous health risks associated with exposure to asbestos. 1
95
By the early 1930s, what eventually became a voluminous stack of credible
documents detailing the hazards of handling asbestos products started to pile
up.' 96 Yet asbestos industry officials kept this information from consumers, users,
and their own employees.' 97 Moreover, as a practice, companies terminated
employees who insisted upon warning labels or other safety precautions to lessen
the risk of injury. 9
Johns-Manville Sales Corporation ("Johns-Manville") was one asbestos
manufacturer named in many lawsuits. Johns-Manville employers intentionally
and deliberately participated in a concerted effort to conceal a known danger. The
extent of Johns-Manville's corporate knowledge about the harmful effects of
asbestos and its willingness to hide disparaging information was well
documented. For instance, Johns-Manville was a member of the Industrial Health
Foundation ("IHF"). Between 1936 and 1941, IHF distributed eleven articles
about the dangerous nature of asbestos to its members and suggested ways to
protect employees who handled the product. As an IHF member, Johns-Manville
192. See Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1223-24. The string that extended from the device helped the
user ensure the device was in place. When bacteria developed on the string, the string became
the catalyst for a number of illnesses that women were experiencing. See id. at 1221-24; see
also Craig v. A.H. Robins. Co., 790 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986).
193. Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1224.
194. See id.; see also Craig, 790 F.2d at 3 (noting that Tuttle was discharged from his
employment at Robins).
195. See Puppe v. A.C. and S., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (D.N.D. 1990) (declining to
categorize several purposeful concealments as one act). For decades, the asbestos industry had
known about the dangers involved in using and handling its products. See Johns-Manville Sales
Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 249 & n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
196. See Janssens, 463 So. 2d at 249 (revealing evidence that manufacturers and suppliers
knew about the hazards of handling asbestos since 1907 when the first report was published);
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 469 (N.J. 1986).
197. Cf Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1466 (D. Haw. 1989) (observing that
defendants could have saved lives by changing their conduct); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines,
Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 381 (D. Pa. 1982) (noting company's refusal to act on doctor's
recommendation to warn employees).
198. See Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 560 (W. Va. 1992) (noting that the
company fired one consultant who recommended protection for workers and suggested a way
of limiting liability).
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received a copy of all those articles, so it knew or should have known that
asbestos was a lethal product. 199
Before the trade articles were published, Johns-Manville's concealment was
already in full effect. In 1933, three years before the first article was delivered,
Johns-Manville knew that its employees were getting sick. Johns-Manville's
workers had begun to seek workers' compensation benefits for asbestos-related
illness. The company reacted by passing a resolution to settle all claims.2"'
After receiving results of industry-wide studies which revealed that prolonged
exposure to asbestos caused asbestosis-chronic lung disease caused by inhaling
asbestos particles-Johns-Manville conducted its own study.20' However, before
Johns-Manville's results were released, its general counsel, Vandiver Brown,
ordered A.J. Lanza, the scientist who conducted the internal study, to alter his
report.20 2 While editing the initial report, Lanza had deleted statements that
minimized the risks and effects of exposure to asbestos. When Brown became
aware that Lanza had redacted information, Brown demanded that Lanza put that
information back into the report. Brown wanted to retain those statements
because he believed that they "presented an aspect of [Lanza's] survey that was
favorable to the industry."2 3 Complying with Brown's wishes, Lanza revised his
report.20 4
Further evidence of Johns-Manville's concealment appeared in its meeting
minutes. After meeting with an asbestos supplier to discuss ways of reducing
employee risk, Johns-Manville conducted its own meeting. All participants
agreed to adhere to the company's "past policy of keeping this matter
confidential. 2 5
Dr. Kenneth Smith, one of Johns-Manville's medical directors, disclosed
another "hush-hush" policy that affected employees who had contracted
asbestosis. Under that directive, company physicians did not tell an employee
when x-rays showed the employee was stricken with asbestosis. The preposterous
and selfish reason for withholding this vital information was that it would allow
the employee to "live and work in peace and the company can benefit by [the
employee's] many years of experience. 20 6
Brown's response to another asbestos supplier's comment was just as startling.
It sounded like conspiracy to deceive the public and to conceal harm. The
president of an asbestos supplier was quoted as saying, "the less said about
asbestos, the better off we are." Brown's reply was, "I quite agree with you that
our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of
publicity."2 7 When the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed one punitive damage
199. See Fischer, 512 A.2d at 469.
200. See id.
201. See Janssens, 463 So. 2d at 249.
202. See id. at 249-50.
203. Id. at 249-50.
204. See id. at 249.
205. Fischer, 512 A.2d at 470.
206. Janssens, 463 So. 2d at 250, 255, 262 (noting that the policy was enforced from 1949
until the 1960s).
207. Fischer, 512 A.2d at 470.
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verdict against Johns-Manville, it wrote, "Not only did it fail to warn users of the
serious health hazards associated with exposure to asbestos, it actually took
affirmative steps to conceal this information from the public. These actions fully
warranted the jury's imposition of punitive damages."2 8
Johns-Manville's far-reaching deceit stretched beyond its corporate
headquarters and influenced the media. At least one Johns-Manville official
strongly suggested that an asbestos trade magazine reporter refrain from
publishing negative articles about asbestos.2"9 When the same reporter sought
feedback on a proposed review of a book that linked asbestos to pneumoconiosis
(lung disease), Brown dissuaded her from reviewing the book. He implied that
since several of the trade magazine's subscribers would not approve of the book
review, it should not be written.2 1 0 Later, Brown intimated that if the industry
decided to allow publication of information about asbestosis, manufacturers and
suppliers should "warn" magazine editors to use American data that was
"milder"-less damaging-than English data.2 '
While this masquerade continued for decades, millions of people who were
exposed to asbestos suffered from serious, sometimes fatal, diseases. According
to medical experts, there are two progressive, latent, and incurable diseases
derived from inhaling asbestos: asbestosis and mesothelioma. Asbestosis is a lung
disease that causes the air sacs to constrict so the sufferer's lung capacity and
pulmonary function are significantly decreased. Mesothelioma is a fatal tumor of
the membrane that lines the walls of the lungs and the abdominal cavity. Further
complications, serious ones, develop as side effects of the medication prescribed
to relieve the symptoms of asbestosis and mesothelioma. So, in addition to
asbestosis and mesothelioma, patients routinely suffer from diabetes, rheumatoid
arthritis, and osteoporosis.1 2
Concealment in the asbestos industry remains a modem day phenomenon. In
1996, a jury in a Texas court issued a verdict of punitive damages against a
product manufacturer. For fourteen years, Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation
("OCF") manufactured Kaylo-a product containing asbestos. OCF's director of
product development warned corporate officers, including the president, that
asbestos-containing fiberglass products caused lung cancer. Further, at ten-year
intervals (in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s), executives received correspondence
from different physicians detailing the hazards of handling asbestos.2"3 Yet OCF
continued to conceal a known danger when it published brochures indicating that
Kaylo was a nontoxic substance.2 4
208. Id. at 481.
209. See id. at 470.
210. See id. (quoting a supplier as saying, "I am inclined to believe she will omit any review
of the book in question.").
211. Id.
212. See id at 475 n.2 (describing asbestosis and mesothelioma); see also Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-86 (5th Cir. 1973) (describing the effects
of asbestosis and mesothelioma).
213. See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1374-76 (3d Cir.) (recounting the company's
documented knowledge), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993).
214. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 413 S.E.2d 630, 642 (Va. 1992).
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Based on the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the
jury verdict for $1.8 million in compensatory damages and $3.7 million in
punitive damages." 5 The court determined that OCF's conduct was reprehensible
because it was aware of and concealed the danger of exposure to Kaylo from its
users.
21 6
Manufacturers hide defects in their products regardless of the devastating
impact of the defects on consumers. A prosthetics manufacturer discovered that
one component part of its prosthetic knee was too large.21 7 For the prosthesis to
have worked effectively, correct sizing was critical. If the prosthesis fit properly,
it would not protrude and strike the patient's kneecap when the knee was
flexed.218 Rather than notify its sales personnel and medical professionals about
its error, Richards Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("Richards") continued to distribute
the improperly sized part.21 9 Not surprisingly, Richards's ill-sized component part
malfunctioned. It caused one recipient to lose a kneecap. 20 A jury awarded him
$25,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. 2 1
Thousands of others, who were arthritic already, suffered agonizing pain and
were immobilized.2 2 All of this suffering occurred for the sole reason that
Richards wanted to protect its competitive edge on the prosthesis market. It
feared that if it took the time to refurbish the part, other companies would lure its
23customers away.
Some manufacturers are just as insensitive when children's lives are at stake.
Riegel Textile Corporation ("Riegel") manufactured flannelette, a cotton material
used to make children's pajamas.' Riegel knew that many children had suffered
severe bums and permanent disfigurement while wearing combustible flannelette
garments. 5 Riegel also knew that multiple lawsuits had been filed against it for
215. See Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883, 889-92 (Tex. App.
1996, writ granted). During another recent trial against OCF, the plaintiff's counsel made the
following accusation in his closing argument:
"Unfortunately, ladies and gentleman, you have heard a story here in this
courtroom the last two weeks of corporate manipulation, of corporate
suppression, and... of corporate lies.
But, what's so bad about that is just not things that occurred over the last 40 or
50 years. But, it's even occurred in this courtroom....
You've got to have courage to tell this big multi-national company, that it's not
going to come into the Virgin Islands and hurt people and lie about it."
Dunn, I F.3d at 1376 nn.3-4 (omissions added) (quoting plaintiff's counsel and indicating
disapproval of argument but not finding harmful error).
216. See Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d at 890.
217. See Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221 (Ct. App. 1983).
218. See id.
219. See id. at 221, 227.
220. See id. at 222.
221. See id. at 221.
222. See id. at 227.
223. See id. at 221.
224. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1980).
225. See id. at 729-30, 740.
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those children's injuries.226 A high level official in the company sent an internal
memorandum to Linton Reynolds, the person in charge of the research
department. In the memorandum entitled "Flammability Liability," the official
warned, "[w]e are always sitting on somewhat of a powder keg as regards our
flannelette being so flammable." '227 The public was not apprised of the dangers
that children were subjected to when they dressed for bed.228
While Riegel was endangering children's lives, Admiral Corporation
("Admiral") jeopardized the lives of whole families. Admiral sold defective color
television sets to unsuspecting customers. A high voltage transformer in the sets
was made of flammable paper and wax materials. Premarket testing was woefully
inadequate but after only one heat test, Admiral and its project manager knew that
the transformer could catch fire in their customers' homes even after the power
had been turned off.229 Admiral's files contained several complaints about
defective televisions and reports of ninety-one fires. 230 Ross Siragusa, Jr., the
president of Admiral, randomly kept some summaries of claims against Admiral
and discarded other summaries.2 3'
When her Admiral television set exploded, Zora Gillham sustained third-degree
bums that covered 18.5% of her body. During the eighteen months in which she
was hospitalized, Gillham underwent seven operations for her bums and
ultimately suffered from a series of complications that rendered her an invalid.232
A jury awarded her $125,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in attorneys'
fees, and $100,000 in punitive damages. 233
Like Robins's executives, Admiral executives and subordinate employees
deceived purchasers about the safety of Admiral television sets. One customer
refused to accept repossession of a set that Admiral repaired after the transformer
caught fire. Admiral employees pressured the customer and assured him that it
was safe to take the set back into his home.234
226. See id. at 734.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 739-40. Riegel claimed to research flammability, but no records were kept.
During a three-year period, Riegel spent only $140,000 on researching the flammability of
flannelette while spending almost $2 million on other research. The court determined that $1
million in punitive damages was appropriate because Riegel did not act to reduce the danger
even though it knew about the danger and feasible means for reducing it. Moreover, Riegel
received significant profits from the sale of its flammable pajamas. See id. at 741.
229. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1975).
230. See id. at 106.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 104-05 (noting that Gillham suffered from, among other complications,
pneumonia, infections, pancreatitis, thrombophlebitis, and colitis). Additionally, in several
instances when televisions caught fire, substantial property damage took place at the customers'
homes. Sometimes fire and smoke damaged only the interior of the room where the television
set was located. In other fires, however, a substantial portion of the dwelling was burned. See
id. at 106-07.
233. See id. at 104.
234. See id. at 107 (reassuring a customer that "no more trouble would develop").
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Finally, one federal district court judge said that "the tobacco industry may be
the king of concealment and disinformation." 5  Tobacco company
whistleblowers have started to blow smoke rings around the industry. Actually,
these whistleblowers have blown the roof off tobacco company headquarters and
exposed their innermost secrets about the hazards of smoking cigarettes. Former
employees, experts, and the owner of the Liggett Group-a small tobacco
company-have disclosed information that had been hidden from the public for
more than thirty years. Tobacco company officials knew that smoking cigarettes
may become addictive behavior. Moreover, they knew that they could reduce the
harmful effects of smoking by decreasing the amount of nicotine cigarettes
contained. 6 Until recently, none of the information about the addictive traits of
cigarette smoking or about the tobacco manufacturers' efforts to manipulate the
nicotine content in cigarettes was shared with the public.237 To ensure secrecy,
some tobacco companies required their employees to sign confidentiality
agreements-codes of silence-promising that they would not testify or give
interviews about their role in the cigarette business."
Internal documentation that has been released for public perusal shows that
tobacco industry executives purposely concealed negative information about
cigarettes.239 Ian Uydess, a former Philip Morris cancer researcher, publicly
accused executives of shelving his suggestions for removing poisonous nitrates
from tobacco. Philip Morris also silenced scientists who were studying whether
nicotine was addictive. Additionally, Uydess alleged that tobacco companies shut
down United States laboratories where hundreds of experiments had been
conducted. Data regarding sensitive experiments that scientists performed in the
United States were transferred to overseas laboratories in Germany and
Switzerland where there would be less intrusion from prying lawyers and United
States government representatives.240
Destruction of documents seems to have been routine at some tobacco
companies. At a hearing, another former Philip Morris scientist gave sworn
235. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d.
Cir. 1992); Christopher Kilbourne, Tobacco Companies Castigated By Judge-He Orders
Release of Studies on Danger, RECORD, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al. But see Haines, 975 F.2d at 88,
97-98 (concluding that there is a basic due process requirement for trial by an impartial judge
and removing the judge who made the comment from the case).
236. See PILIP J. HILTs, SMoKEscREEN 42-56 (1996); Tom Lowry, Liggett Settlement Burns
Tobacco Firms, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 1997, at lB (announcing Liggett's plan to place a
warning that smoking is addictive on cigarette packages).
237. See Lowry, supra note 236, at 1B; Solo Hailed as 'Hero' of Tobacco Litigation, LAW.
WKLY. USA, May 20, 1996, at 486; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Turncoats Smoking Out Tobacco
Firms'Secrets, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAzE'rrE, Apr. 7, 1996, at A20.
238. See Stolberg, supra note 237, at A20 (reporting that Jeffrey Wigand, a former Brown
& Williamson scientist, was sued for breach of contract when he disclosed tobacco industry
secrets).
239. See Bill Ibelle, Solo Sues Firms for Tobacco Cover-Up, LAW. WKLY. USA, Nov. 4,
1996, at B2. The tobacco industry has not paid any damages in the forty-two year history of
lawsuits that have been brought against it. See id.
240. See id; see also Stolberg, supra note 237, at A20 (announcing Liggett's plan to place
a warning that smoking is addictive on cigarette packs).
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testimony that he shredded data regarding his findings. Dr. William Raymond
Morgan tested the level of "tobacco-specific nitrosamine"-a carcinogen-in
Virginia Slims cigarettes. He discovered that Virginia Slims cigarettes contained
a much higher level of the carcinogen than he had ever witnessed. Morgan
testified that his supervisor, Dr. Cathy Ellis, then the manager of the Biochemical
Research Division, ordered him to destroy data that he had compiled. Even
though Ellis's directive was in complete derogation of a court order, Morgan
yielded to her command and shredded the document. Now Ellis is the vice
president of research and development.24'
Tobacco industry officials' disrespect for the law has been pervasive. They
conspired against the public and public representatives. On April 14, 1994, top
executives from seven tobacco companies testified before the House
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. Before the interrogation began,
each executive raised his hand and solemnly gave an oath to tell the truth. Then,
one by one, each spoke into a microphone and swore that he believed that
nicotine was not addictive.242 Evidence, released after they testified, showed that
those executives lied.243 Consequently, they may now be subject to criminal
prosecution and penalties for perjury as well as punitive damages in civil
actions.244
Unfortunately, evidence that some attorneys who advise tobacco companies
actively encouraged and participated in cover-ups may have been unearthed along
with indicia of other corporate misconduct. Tobacco company lawyers, officers
of the court, have been accused of deceitful and unethical acts to protect their
clients. Reportedly, one attorney coaxed a scientist to revise a report by
threatening to withdraw funds that financed the scientist's research project.25
Other attorneys have hidden a mass of documents containing unflattering
information behind a shroud of attorney-client privilege objections. 246 To avoid
241. See Ibelle, supra note 239, at B2; cf HILTS, supra note 236, at 20 (discussing a
"scheme for shipping dangerous documents out of the country").
242. See HILTS, supra note 236, at 121-23, 147-74 (stating that Thomas Edwin Sandefur, Jr.
of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company testified before Congress and said that he did not
believe that nicotine is addictive).
243. See id. at 124; Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, Liggett May Label Tobacco
"Addictive", WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at A3; Lowry, supra note 236, at 1B; John Schwartz,
Internal Papers Fuel Tobacco Debate: Cigarette Firms May Face Turning Point in
Regulation, Litigation, WASH. POST, May 14, 1994, at Al (reporting about lies, withholding
scientific evidence, and closing labs).
244. See Pierre Thomas & John Schwartz, U.S. Widens Tobacco Investigation, WASH. POST,
Sept. 8, 1996, at Al (reporting on an investigation of tobacco executives for possible perjury).
Perjury is making a false statement, under oath. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15
(McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (1993); TEX. PENAL CODEANN. § 37.02(a) (West
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (Michie 1997); see also Ganzie v. Commonwealth, 482
S.E.2d 863 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (convicting defendant of three counts of false statements).
245. See Ibelle, supra note 239, at B2. But see Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210,
1224 (Kan. 1987) (stating that one lawyer secretly saved copies of some documents that were
supposed to be destroyed).
246. The privilege protects confidential communications between an attorney and her client
that are made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance. See Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). But see Craig v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 790 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
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disclosure of company documents, tobacco company lawyers have been accused
of falsely claiming that the documents were privileged when they knew that no
privilege barred disclosure.247 Unlike Robins's counsel, however, tobacco
company attorneys did not require destruction of documents.248
Tobacco company executives' mayhem is far-flung. Millions of people are
addicted to the nicotine contained in cigarettes.249 Many of them suffer from
debilitating illnesses such as lung cancer, heart disease, and emphysema. 5 Some
smokers suffer unnatural and painful deaths. 2s' Meanwhile, cigarette
manufacturers continue to produce cigarettes, conceal the health risks of smoking
cigarettes, and even heartlessly gear advertising toward enticing twelve-year-olds
to take their first puff.
2 2
A complete discussion of the concealment issue must entail consideration of the
reasons that manufacturers conceal and destroy information. A few arguments
have surfaced. None are persuasive or acceptable.
A paramount concern with manufacturers is fear of losing sales and profits.2 3
Some company officials value sales quotas and stock prices more than consumer
safety. 4 "All too often in the choice between the physical health of consumers
Cir. 1986) (finding that "fraudulent misrepresentation and cover-up vitiates... [the] attorney-
client privilege [and] work product immunity").
247. See Ibelle, supra note 239, at B2; see also HILTS, supra note 236, at 20; Hwang &
Geyelin, supra note 243, at A3; Lowry, supra note 236, at IB.
In addition to restricting disclosure of documents to the public, the company denied some
company employees access to this information. "Whole areas of tobacco factories were
eventually made out of bounds to other employees." HILTs, supra note 236, at 20.
248. See HILTS, supra note 236, at 20 (speculating that counsel were either very confident
or fearful of "legal retribution").
249. See id. at 88.
250. See id. at 27, 36.
251. See id. it 41.
252. See id. at 63-101 (detailing industry's practices of planning advertisements and placing
stores to attract young customers); Anita Manning, Liggett Will Help States in Lawsuits, USA
TODAY, Mar. 21-23, 1997, at IA (reporting on tobacco companies practice of targeting minors
in their sales pitches).
253. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (noting company's rejection of doctor's recommendation that warning labels be used on
asbestos products because company felt warnings would decrease sales); Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 723, 740 (Minn. 1980) (noting company's fear that warnings
would "stigmatize" the product and affect marketing).
254. See Cippillone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1986); Cippillone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 90 (D.N.J. 1986) (noting company's claim that disclosure
of corporate records "might prove embarrassing and affect the market price of defendants'
stock"), mandamus denied, 822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1987); Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 192
Cal. Rptr. 219, 221, 227 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting company's concealment of error in
prosthetic manufacture "to protect its market position" and to maximize profits); Amy Johnson,
GM Loses $1.55 Million in Delta 98 Case, LAW. WKLY. USA, Nov. 4, 1996, at B6 (reporting
on company's decision to ignore a computer chip defect that caused frequent stalling
problems); see also HILTS, supra note 236, at 1-2 (indicating that tobacco company executives
had a clandestine meeting because salespersons were concerned and stock values had declined).
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and the financial well-being of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure,
sales over safety, and money over morality. 255
Undoubtedly, the strong potential of protracted litigation, losing trials, and
accompanying legal fees are driving forces in cover-ups. Dow Coming reported
that its litigation costs in 1994 alone exceeded $200 million. 6 A Robins attorney
must have given credence to those concerns because he decided that taking the
Dalkon Shield off the market would be viewed as "a 'confession of liability' and
Robins would lose many of the pending lawsuits. 257
Some companies go to great lengths to stave off unwanted publicity. As
previously indicated, Vandiver Brown and other asbestos industry personnel
manipulated the media and conspired to deprive the public of damaging
information about asbestos.258 Bad press about a product or the company's lack
of ethics could sound the death knell for that company.
One writer offered another rationale for covering up product deficiencies or
harmful effects of using the product. Once negative information about the product
is exposed, there will not be any more speculation about whether the product
presents health risks or whether it is dangerous.2 " This implies that concealment
allows continuance of production as long as there is a debate about the possibility
of harm. On the other hand, if published data unequivocally proves that the
product is harmful, it will affect the manufacturers' ability to produce and sell
that product.
Other manufacturers do a cost-benefit analysis and consumers lose. A
manufacturer could decide that it would be less expensive for it to risk a lawsuit
or risk injuring consumers than to redesign the product.2 0 Minor repairs can cost
millions of dollars. In a letter, one Riegel official wrote that he knew how to
produce a safer fabric for children's pajamas but since the flame-retardant
chemicals he needed were so expensive, he would not use the chemicals unless
federal law required it.261 While expressing the same concern during a recent
congressional debate, Congressman Scott of Virginia complained that
255. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J.), vacated 975 F.2d 81 (3d
Cir. 1992); see also SOBOL, supra note 178, at 7 (discussing manufacturer's decision to dismiss
idea of any change in the Dalkon Shield because it would delay production).
256. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 922 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also Johns-
Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 422
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (estimating that each suit cost $40,000 excluding costs of appeals).
257. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1221 (Kan. 1987) (quoting a Robins "Status
Report for the Dalkon Shield" which discussed the legal implications of recalling the product).
258. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 470 (N.J. 1986).
259. See HULTs, supra note 236, at 17-20.
260. See Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1462, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989) (citing Leonen
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 285 n.7 (D.N.J. 1989)); see also Stolberg, supra
note 237, at A20 (discussing tobacco manufacturers' fear of lawsuits as a rationale for
maintaining secrecy of tobacco research).
261. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Minn. 1980).
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corporations continued to sell highly flammable children's pajamas because it
was cheaper to make the unmodified pajamas than to reduce flammability. 262
Ford Motor Company, also, made a horrific cost-benefit determination. It
calculated that a certain number of human lives would be lost when Pinto gas
tanks exploded upon impact and caused passengers to bum to death. Rather than
redesign the gas tanks at a cost of approximately ten dollars per automobile,263
Ford representatives performed "a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives
and limbs against corporate profits. ' 2  Similarly, Robins knew that the string
attached to the Dalkon Shield was causing severe medical problems for its three
million female customers. However, Robins repeatedly ignored the danger signs
and refused to use a slower production method to eliminate the problem.265
Finally, the ultimate consequence of liability or disclosure that companies may
dread is "death" of the company due to a huge vindictive award or several smaller
awards. Consequently, the company could go bankrupt. Moreover, if that
company's only product is irretrievably defective, it may be forced to go out of
business .266
In the business world, paramount concerns are guarding the company and
protecting its profits. Whether innocent people are physically or emotionally hurt
as a result of the concealment is irrelevant. In the delicate balance of business and
safety, business comes first. Although these reasons for concealment may appear
laudable to corporate representatives, any and all of them justify punitive awards.
Of course, there are some inherently dangerous products, like automobiles, that
cannot be rendered risk-free. Despite known risks, however, millions of people
make an informed choice to use these products every day. Concealment
eliminates the freedom of choice that consumers and users are entitled to make
regarding whether they should use a certain product. Moreover, when
manufacturers like Robins and Johns-Manville conceal negative effects of
product use, they deprive the injured person of the opportunity to seek proper
262. See 142 CONG. REc. H4760 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (reporting the testimony of
Representative Scott, member of the Committee on the Judiciary, that the pajamas were so
flammable that they ignited like newspaper).
263. See Rustad, supra note 12, at 53-54.
264. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (indicating
that Ford decided not to repair the fuel tank of its Pinto automobile based on a cost-benefit
analysis); see Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 588-89 (Tex. App. 1996, writ
granted) (detailing experts' testimony regarding Ford's "cost-benefit" analysis). At the trial in
Miles, a case involving defects in Ford's passenger restraint system, an accident reconstruction
expert described how Ford's cost-benefit analysis was conducted:
[W]hen Ford identified what it believed was a defective product it would first run
a "cost benefit" analysis to see what the cost would be to fix or repair the defect.
Next, Ford would assign arbitrary values to each death or serious injury and
would predict the number of occurrences which would involve either death or
serious injury. Finally, Ford would determine the cost to litigate such deaths and
injuries.... [I]f the cost to repair the defect exceeded the other costs, Ford would
not correct the defect.
Id. at 588-89.
265. See SOBOL, supra note 178, at 7.
266. See supra notes 92-108.
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care and treatment for the injury that the product causes.267 It prevents people like
asbestos handlers from taking precautions to protect themselves. 2"
Usually, the doors to corporate boardrooms-where decisions to eradicate
documents and to hide information are made-are closed to the general public.
Thus, cover-ups may, and do, remain undetected for many years-that is, until
someone who was behind one of those doors becomes conscientious and discloses
corporate wrongdoing. 269 As a result of these disclosures, it is evident that
consumers cannot depend upon manufacturers to monitor their own conduct.
Therefore, to protect the public, legislatures, judges, and consumers must
endeavor to ensure production and sale of safe products. One way of guaranteeing
public safety is through granting punitive awards in appropriate circumstances:
[W]orking American families [have a right] to meaningfully punish huge
corporations that put faulty and sometimes deadly products onto the market
and hurt American families. Eliminating such protections would give product
manufacturers or sellers a green light to cut dangerous comers, to reap higher
profits. The result? More deadly products like the Dalkon Shield, exploding
Ford Pintos, flammable children's pajamas, defective heart valves and other
nightmares that cause serious injury or death.27
The case summaries discussed in this section represent only a few corporate
incidents which justify assessment of substantial punitive awards. Also, they
reveal the courts' and jurors' willingness to assess punitive damages whenever
manufacturers conceal harmful defects in products and cause their customers
personal harm or death. Intentional and malicious concealment exemplify the type
of impropriety that the Gore Court described as reprehensible and egregious
267. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 468-69 (N.J. 1986) (noting lower
court's observation that company officials suspected pulmonary disease before it was
diagnosed).
268. See id. at 469-70 (claiming that the cover-up prevented asbestos workers from
protecting themselves from prolonged exposure to the product).
269. That is what happened in late 1996. The Texaco cover-up, however, involved racial
discrimination rather than a defective product. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that we are living
in an era where corporate executives find it more acceptable to destroy documents than to
disclose and correct the mistakes that they have committed. It reveals the kind of atmosphere
that breeds this misconduct.
In that case, someone audiotaped a Texaco board meeting. Most scrupulous members of this
society were appalled when the tape was played for the public. During the meeting, a Texaco
official offered to shred or withhold some documents and to lie about the existence of other
documents. Texaco had been asked to produce those documents during the discovery phase of
a lawsuit in which it was a named defendant. See Jim Fitzgerald, Ex-Treasurer Accused of
Conspiracy-Second Exec Indicted in "Texaco Tape" Case, CHI. SUN-TIMES, at 14; Jack E.
White, Texaco's White-Collar Bigots Top Executives, Confronting a Discrimination Suit, Talk
about Shredding Documents, TIME, Nov. 18, 1996, at 104. At that time, Robert Ulrich was
Texaco's treasurer. On the tape, Ulrich declared, "We're going to purge the [expletive] out of
these books.... We're not going to have any [expletive] thing that... we don't need to be in
them." Sharon Walsh, Destroying Documents and Legal Defenses: Experts Say Texaco Case
Points Up How Shredders Can Come Back to Haunt Companies, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1997,
atHl.
270. 142 CONG. REC. H4761 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (testimony of Congressman Markey
of Massachusetts).
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enough to merit a punitive award that has a high ratio to the compensatory
damages awarded.27' Certainly, it is the kind of conduct that makes continuation
of punitive awards, unencumbered by bright line formulas, imperative.
Publicizing awards puts the manufacturers and others like them on notice that
punitive awards will be forthcoming if they emulate the condemned conduct in
the future. Publicizing the outcomes of cases like these can provide "strong
incentive" for other manufacturers to refrain from engaging in similar misconduct
because they know that they may be required to pay a similar penalty.272
Punitive damages play other essential roles in product liability litigation. First,
under the "private attorney general" theory, the potential of obtaining punitive
damages gives individual consumers or users incentive to commence lawsuits
against manufacturers for the public's benefit. The possibility of recovering these
damages encourages private citizens to challenge corporate giants who operate
in a manner that results in harm to that citizen and the public at large.273
Second, private attorneys general who are willing to fight for the public cannot
realistically litigate their claims against manufacturers without legal
representation. The possibility of obtaining punitive damages encourages lawyers
to provide zealous representation even when a small compensatory award is
expected.274 Also, these private attorneys general may not have the means to
finance this litigation. The potential of receiving a large punitive award
encourages lawyers to sue manufacturers on a contingent-fee basis. "[L]awyers
usually do not accept a case unless they see an acceptable probability of
economic success for themselves in doing so.,,275
Moreover, exemplary damages are necessary because consumers cannot rely
upon administrative remedies to protect them from injury. Administrative
regulatory provisions are inappropriate substitutes for punitive damages. The
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 ("CPSA") 276 is the federal statute that is
supposed to protect "the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated
with consumer products. 277 Congress passed the CPSA after it found that federal
laws promulgated to protect consumers were ineffectual. 278 However, the CPSA
271. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1599-603 (1996).
272. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 4, at 25; cf DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §
3.1, at 282 (2d ed. 1993) (declaring that compensatory damages could have the same effect).
273. See Baas v. Hoye, 766 F.2d 1190, 1196 (8th Cir. 1985); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d
1353, 1358 (Me. 1985); DOBBS, supra note 273, § 3.11(3), at 1327-28; Dan B. Dobbs, Ending
Punishment in 'Punitive' Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 847
(1989) (advocating usage of punitive awards as a "surrogate for attorney fees"); Owen M. Fiss,
The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21, 26 (1996) (supporting
the incentive argument); see also Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 917 S.W.2d 883,
891 (Tex. App. 1996, writ granted) (noting Alabama's policy of including legal fees and
expenses in punitive award calculations). See generally ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 14, at 267-316 (recommending that defendants pay prevailing claimants' attorneys' fees
and expenses).
274. See Baas, 766 F.2d at 1196; DOBBS, supra note 273, at 327-28.
275. Saks, supra note 13, at 1190.
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994).
277. 1d. § 2051(b)(1).
278. See id. § 2051(a)(5).
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itself has inadequately fulfilled its mission. First of all, a consumer's private
cause of action is limited to certain specific claims. Under the CPSA, prohibited
conduct is defined as knowing or willful violations of a consumer product safety
rule or Consumer Product Safety Commission mandates.279 Thus, if manufacturers
commit any other wrongful act, consumers may not sue them under the CPSA.
The second flaw in the CPSA is that the civil penalty that may be imposed for
knowingly or willfully violating a consumer product safety rule is constrained to
"damages sustained."28 Courts have interpreted that phrase to mean that plaintiffs
are entitled to recover only compensatory damages, that is, compensation for
actual losses they sustained, with no punitive damages available.2"' However, the
court has discretion to award legal fees and reasonable expert witness fees.282 The
purposes of the extra penalties are to give potential claimants an incentive to file
suit and to discourage defendants from violating the CPSA.283
A third shortcoming is that civil penalties that may be paid under the CPSA are
insufficient to discourage a manufacturer from endangering consumers. No more
than $2000 may be assessed against a defendant for each civil violation. In
addition, the statute places a cap on the total accumulation of damages that
manufacturers must pay. Regardless of the number of consumers injured or the
extent of their injuries, the maximum amount that manufacturers will pay is $1.25
million for injuries that the same product may have caused.284 Such relief is not
sufficient to punish or deter manufacturers from producing products that
jeopardize consumer safety.
Other penalties under the CPSA are inadequate. For example, under § 2068 of
the CPSA, it is illegal to sell a product that is not in conformance with consumer
product safety standards.8 5 For one violation of that provision, a manufacturer
may be fined "not more than $5,000 or be imprisoned not more than one year, or
both." '286 Of course, imprisonment will get manufacturers' attention. However, the
fine, which is the likely penalty that a court will assess, is de minimis for
corporations which have deep pockets.
Finally, the CPSA does not control risks of injury that all products may cause.
The CPSA does not regulate "drugs, devices, or cosmetics."28 Neither does it
regulate "tobacco and tobacco products" that have recently come under
279. See Deck v. McBrien, 759 F. Supp. 454, 455 (C.D. Ill. 1991); Young v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288, 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
280. 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
281. See Baas v. Hoye, 766 F.2d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Local 20, Teamsters
Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964), and Nelson v. Restaurants of Iowa, Inc., 338
N.W.2d 881, 885 (Iowa 1983)); cf Young, 560 F. Supp. at 294 (holding that whether punitive
damages are recoverable is determined by state law).
282. See 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a). But see id. § 2072(b) (allowing the court to deny costs if the
plaintiff recovers less than $10,000).
283. See Wahba v. H & N Prescription Ctr., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1).
285. See id. § 2068(a)(1).
286. Id § 2069(a).
287. Id § 2052(a)(1)(H); accordDeck v. McBrien, 759 F. Supp. 454, 455 (C.D. II1. 1991);
see 16 C.F.R. § 1145 (1997) (listing products which the CPSA regulates).
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scrutiny.288 For the most part, statutes that do control those products are just as
ineffective.289
When the CPSA was promulgated in 1972, Congress acknowledged that not
only were federal laws inadequate to protect consumers, but also that state and
local government control of "unreasonable risks of injury associated with
consumer products [was] inadequate."29 The results of a comprehensive study in
the early 1990s were consistent with Congress's findings. The study revealed that
neither state, local, nor federal government regulators aggressively enforced their
authority to prosecute and penalize corporate defendants who threatened public
safety. One federal government official even admitted that state and local
building officials, insurance companies, product liability suits, and bad publicity
were the primary method of pressuring manufacturers to produce safer
products.29" '
Criminal statutes are not any more effective at deterring personal injury. Some
state statutes provide that, as a mitigating factor, the trier of fact should consider
the severity of any criminal penalties to which manufacturers have been subjected
before punitive damages are assessed.292 However, light criminal sanctions and
failure to prosecute under applicable criminal statutes do not encourage
manufacturers to protect consumers.293 Usually agencies lack enthusiasm and
tenaciousness when investigating or prosecuting company executives who violate
criminal laws. 9 When the government prosecuted Richardson-Merrell for
violating the false writing statute295 in the production of its MERI29 drug, the
corporate defendants pleaded nolo contendere.296 When they were sentenced, the
total fine that all defendants were ordered to pay was only $80,000.297 In another
matter, Ford Motor Company would have been liable for only $35,000 if it were
convicted of three counts of reckless homicide.298 When the government rarely
288. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(B).
289. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1994) (listing
civil and criminal penalties for various offenses). But see United States v. Articles of Banned
Hazardous Substances Consisting of 1030 Gross (More or Less) of Baby Rattles, 614 F. Supp.
226, 232-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (banning toy rattles which could choke a baby).
290. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(4).
291. See Rustad, supra note 12, at 73-74.
292. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-
65(f)(ii)(4) (Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(2)(g) (1995); see also Tuttle v. Raymond,
494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985). But see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23
(1991) (showing reluctance to compare criminal and civil sanctions because criminal
punishment includes imprisonment).
293. See Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1356.
294. See Rustad, supra note 12, at 74-75. See generally Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts,
Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 656 (1980).
295. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation
by anyone in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches).
296. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 294, at 657 n. I 1l.
297. See id.
298. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 294, at 657.
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prosecutes a crime, punitive damages act as a substitute for the criminal system's
failure to act.299
Too often, criminal fines are trivial. Therefore, they do very little in the way of
discouraging manufacturers from creating and marketing products that place
consumers at risk. "It is precisely because monetary penalties under government
regulations prescribing business standards or the criminal law are so inadequate
and ineffective as deterrents against a manufacturer and distributor of mass
produced defective products that punitive damages must be of sufficient amount
to discourage such practices.""3 '
Also, some criminal fines are paid to the state. Of course, this provides
financial benefits for the state. However, there may not be sufficient
compensation, under these statutes, for the injured consumers' medical expenses
or their pain and suffering."' Actually, when statutes allow it, punitive damages
should be combined with low criminal fines so that the maximum punishment will
be meted out.3"2 Generally, criminal statutes have not been used in a way that
would give manufacturers incentive to produce safer products. If the potential
corporate loss was higher and government regulators enforced their own
regulations, perhaps manufacturers would feel some sense of urgency about
producing safer products." 3
On a more positive note, there is some evidence of positive impacts that
punitive damages have on some companies' business tactics. After an exhausting
empirical study, one scholar concluded that
punitive damages played a vital social policy role in discouraging firms from
marketing dangerous products or failing to recall them. The vast majority of
dangerous products have been recalled, modified, and redesigned by their
manufacturers .... In general, companies think twice about cutting corners
on safety when faced with the prospect of indeterminate punitive damages.3°4
299. See id. at 656. The authors further distinguished punitive damages from criminal
penalties:
It would be naive to suppose-even where conduct is of a type that is frequently
prosecuted-that the criminal system will always fulfill its function. Practices
such as plea bargaining, suspending sentences, and granting pardons, immunity,
and parole, water down the deterrent effect of the criminal law. Furthermore,
maximum criminal penalties, to ensure due process, must be established in
advance by the legislature. Punitive damages, on the other hand, can be
individualized to provide a deterrent that will be adequate for each case.
Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
300. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389 (Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
301. See Carl M. Selinger, Robinson Crusoe Torts, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 169, 184-89 (1993).
302. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985) (seeing no reason why
imposing a criminal fine should preclude assessment of punitive damages too); Roshak v.
Leathers, 560 P.2d 275, 279 (Or. 1976) (arguing that elimination of punitive damages would
have the result of reducing the maximum punishment which the legislature knew to be
applicable).
303. See Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1358.
304. Rustad, supra note 12, at 79-80.
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
A few examples support this scholar's position. Although it took some time to do
it, Robins finally did recall the Dalkon Shield °.3 " Admiral redesigned its
television tubes.0 6 In fact, after litigation, approximately eighty-two percent of
corporate defendants in one study took some step to remedy the danger. Forty-
three percent of these defendants took remedial steps before litigation.0
There is additional evidence that the purposes of punitive damages are being
fulfilled. As discussed in Part I, some companies, including Robins and Johns-
Manville, have feared punitive awards so much that they have attempted to shield
their assets behind a bankruptcy facade. 08 In addition, the punitive damages issue
caused a three-month stalemate during recent negotiations among tobacco
company representatives and state representatives for settlement of Medicare
reimbursement claims.3 9 Tobacco company representatives wanted written
assurances that they would not be obligated to pay punitive damages in
subsequent lawsuits by individual claimants. 31  For several days, an impasse on
that issue threatened to halt negotiations because many of the attorneys general
would not agree to limit tobacco companies' liability.
311
[T]he tort liability system may be doing a better job as a deterrent than it
usually receives credit for .... [T]he data strongly suggest that our tort
system hits, infrequently and lightly. Yet, it has nevertheless somehow
succeeded in frightening a great many potential defendants, who seem to go
to considerable lengths to avoid becoming actual defendants. 311
V. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST EXCESSIVE AND UNJUST AWARDS
PROTECT MANUFACTURERS FROM ECONOMIC DISASTER
Having concluded that punitive damages still are necessary deterrents to
unscrupulous conduct, it is important to consider some protection for
manufacturers. Although some advocates lobby for immediate and drastic
changes in the tort system, ample and effective statutes, rules of procedure, and
common law already exist for controlling punitive awards. This section highlights
some protective measures which shield manufacturers from unreasonable punitive
awards, and in some cases, protect them from punitive damages altogether.
305. See id. at 82.
306. See id. at 81.
307. See id. at 79.
308. See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.4 (5th Cir.
1984) (discussing argument that asbestos litigation threatened Johns-Manville's solvency).
309. See Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, Tobacco Agreement Needed Nudge from White
House, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997, at A6.
310. See Peter Baker & Saundra Torry, White House Won't Bless Tobacco Deal; Officials
Want to See a Final Package Before Backing Liability Limits, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at
Al.
311. See id.
312. Saks, supra note 13, at 1286.
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A. Closer Judicial Supervision Will Help to Control and
Prevent Awards
1. Pretrial Procedures
a. Specificity in Pleading
Control should be exercised at the very beginning of lawsuits against
manufacturers. In the first place, some courts have held that punitive damages are
special damages under Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring
a claimant to allege those damages with specificity in the complaint.3 Under the
aegis of Rule 12, if the claim is legally insufficient and it is clear that the claimant
cannot recover exemplary damages, that claim should be dismissed." 4 When these
rules are enforced, they protect manufacturers from the costly litigation of
punitive damages issues when the claimant has failed to state a claim for those
damages. On the other hand, an allegation for punitive damages may be sufficient
to state a claim where a complainant alleges that a manufacturer knew its product
was defectively designed, knew that the defects caused serious human injuries,
knew how to prevent those injuries, and intentionally concealed its knowledge of
the defects from consumers." 5
b. Frivolous Demands for Punitive Damages
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure acts as a further deterrent
against frivolous punitive damage claims. Rule 1 I(b)(3) mandates that a party
certify that her "allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." '316 Thus, this
rule protects manufacturers from unsupported claims for punitive damages.
Plaintiffs who file such claims may be subject to various sanctions under Rule
11 (c). 17
313. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 9(g); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1) (1997)
(requiring specific prayer for punitive damages in the complaint); Daugherty v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D. 693, 695 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (denying motion for more definite
statement because fraud claims alleged in support of punitive damages were sufficient);
Worthem v. Gillette Co., 774 F. Supp. 514, 517-18 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding that plaintiff had
stated a sufficient claim for punitive damages).
314. See generally Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 462 (Wis. 1980) (holding
that a claim for punitive damages "should be dismissed only if it is clear that the plaintiff
cannot recover under any condition").
315. See id.; cf Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (holding that a claim "should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim").
316. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3).
317. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (c).
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c. Class Actions
Class actions present another means of "protect[ing] defendants in mass tort
cases from 'execution' by punitive damages without granting them immunity from
such damages."3 8 Courts and litigants agree that a class action suit is the most
acceptable alternative for controlling the effects of multiple punitive damage
awards.319 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class actions
in the federal court system. Under Rule 23, either the plaintiff or the defendant
may ask the trial court to certify that, in one lawsuit, a group of claimants may
litigate common issues of fact or law that arise from their use of the same
defective product.32 °
A class action has been lauded as "a way of subduing the monster-like qualities
of that special type of repetitive litigation so much the result of our modem
technological society. '3 21 In class actions on the punitive damages issue, jurors
would award a single sum to be shared by all potential claimants who prove
liability in subsequent proceedings.322 Submitting to a class action would
eliminate the possibility that the manufacturer would be bankrupted by multiple
awards and ensure that other claimants would receive some remuneration other
318. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 914 (Il. App. Ct. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1983); see id. at 913 (suggesting that corporate defendants may
want to make a request for certifying a plaintiffs' class action in order to avoid a large number
of tort judgments). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendments)
(deciding that the class action tool was inappropriate for "mass accident" cases because
significant questions of liability, damages, and defenses could affect "individuals in different
ways").
319. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 895-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (concluding that without it, punitive awards may exhaust funds
available for other claimants), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Fischer
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 479-80 (N.J. 1986) (suggesting that the "most likely
solution" could be the use of class actions); State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268,
1272 (Or. 1980) (listing class actions as one possible means of avoiding the problem of
multiple punitive damages awards); Glasscock, supra note 7, at 1005-08 (discussing
advantages and disadvantages of class action); Seltzer, supra note 80, at 61-92 (same). But see
In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1086 (6th Cir. 1996) (deciding that plaintiffs
failed to meet Rule 23(a) and 23(b) prerequisites); In re Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 856-57
(decertifying class that did not meet Rule 23(a) requirements). See generally In re Asbestos
Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 972-88 (5th Cir. 1996) (certifying a class to include future claimants who
have not been injured).
320. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see, e.g., Dante v. Dow Coming Corp., 143 F.R.D. 136, 137
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (certifying a class of thousands of women); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109
F.R.D. 269, 277-81 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (certifying class for litigation of common issue on
punitive damages), affid, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Fischer, 512 A.2d at 479.
321. In re Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 921 (decertifying class because Rule 23(a)
requirements were not met); see also Georgine v. Achem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996). But see Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying request
for certification).
322. See In re Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920 (punishing defendant once); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1965) (finding that in a class action, "full
assessment of the punitive damages can be made").
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than actual damages.3" In the Agent Orange litigation, the punitive damages issue
was resolved in a class action involving 2.4 million Vietnam veterans.324 The
same methodology was used in assessing punishment for Dow Coming in breast
implant litigation involving more than one million women. 25 In one opinion, a
district court judge declared that "[a] Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nationwide class action
for punitive damages obviates many of the abuses inherent in multiple punitive
awards. 326
This Rule 23 alternative will benefit the manufacturer by reducing the potential
for financial ruin, but it may penalize the innocent consumer.327 In class action
suits, thousands of claimants who prove entitlement to punitive damages, except
those who opt out of the class action, must share the award. When one class
action was settled in Alabama, class members received two-dollar judgments that
netted a negative balance because they owed ninety-one dollars in legal fees.
3 21
Thus, what appears to be a large award may be divided into very small portions
for each claimant.
323. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976);
Froud, 437 N.E.2d at 914. But see Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982)
(noting that different punitive damages standards affect the commonality requirement of Rule
23). See generally In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989) (advocating
liberal, not restrictive, construction of Rule 23 in mass tort litigation).
324. See generally In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (describing notice to potential claimants and settlement distribution), afrd, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
mandamus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984).
325. See Dante, 143 F.R.D. at 137-38 (certifying class for recipients of silicone gel breast
implants and their spouses); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir.
1994) (certifying claims for punitive damages associated with torture and illegal arrests);
Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. 269; Important Legal Notice, Women with Breast Implants, WASH. POST,
Apr. 24, 1994, at A27 (giving notice to potential claimants regarding worldwide class action
settlement of breast implant claims); Judge Accepts Terms of Implant Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1994, at 14 (calling the breast implant settlement the "largest class-action settlement
in American history").
326. In re Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 892, 899 (referring to class action as a "powerful
tool"); see In re Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D. at 718 (certifying class action for the punitive
damages issue); Froud, 437 N.E.2d at 913-14; see also Green, 541 F.2d at 1340-41 (denying
writ of mandamus to decertify class for damages decision). See generally School Dist. of
Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Que., Ltd. (In re School Asbestos), 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
In In re Dalkon Shield, A.H. Robins faced $2.3 billion in punitive damages while its net worth
was only $280,394,000. Therefore, the trial court certified the class to resolve the issue of
punitive damages in one trial to avoid "overkill." In re Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920.
327. See Froud, 437 N.E.2d at 914.
328. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1569 (1997); see also Susan Adams, Fighting Back, FORBES, Apr. 22, 1996, at 129;
Terry Carter, A Divided Front in Tobacco Wars, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 32.
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d. Discovery Limitations
Judged may limit the scope of discovery in accordance with Rule 26(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.329 Discovery limitations shield manufacturers
from mandatory disclosure of privileged information or corporate information
that is irrelevant to the issue before the court.33 Limitations on discovery lessen
manufacturers' litigation expenses and burdens. They also protect manufacturers
from discovery abuses. For instance, for its protection against "annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," a manufacturer may
request a protective order under Rule 26(c).3 ' On the contrary, when a
manufacturer hides evidence that has been requested or resists discovery without
justification, a number of sanctions may be imposed including relaying
information about the nondisclosure to the jury. 32
e. Consolidation
Under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judges may
consolidate cases for a single trial on one or more issues or for completion of
pretrial proceedings. When several plaintiffs sue the same defendant and their
separate causes of action involve common questions of law or fact, the court may
combine the cases to resolve those common issues.333 Consolidation would save
time and litigation expenses for courts and claimants as well as manufacturers. 3
329. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
330. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting the scope of discovery to relevant matter that is
not privileged).
331. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). But see Cippillone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 88-
92 (D.N.J. 1986) (denying motion for protective order for failure to show "good cause" for
nondisclosure).
332. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 461 S.E.2d 877, 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(deciding that argument to the jury was properly admitted so that the jury could take an
"adverse inference" from the nondisclosure); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), 37.
333. Rule 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, [the court] may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a); see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994)
(consolidating cases for claimants seeking punitive damages); King v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1990) (consolidating cases).
334. See, e.g., In re New York Asbestos Litig., 145 F.R.D. 644, 654-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 107 F.R.D. 250 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (consolidating fifty
claimants' actions against the defendants), affd, 810 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1987); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1982); ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 667
A.2d 116, 144-50 (Md. 1995) (concluding that consolidation was not erroneous); see also FED.
R. Civ. P. 42(a).
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f. Bifurcation
Bifurcating trials is another way in which courts could administer product
liability cases when there is a demand for punitive damages. Federal Rule 42(b)
provides that "[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a
separate trial of any claim." '335 In this context, cases involving demands for
punitive damages are tried in two independent phases. First, the court holds a trial
on the issue of liability. A finding or verdict of liability would render the claimant
eligible for punitive damages. Then the court presides over a second trial that
focuses on whether the claimant is entitled to punitive damages.336
Bifurcation reduces the risk of prejudice verdicts against a manufacturer. For
instance, to decide whether the manufacturer is liable for actual damages, jurors
do not need to know the manufacturer's financial condition. If they had that
information, jurors could develop a bias against the corporate defendant.
Bifurcation allows jurors, in the punitive damages phase of the trial, to consider
evidence regarding other satisfied and unsatisfied punitive awards and the
manufacturer's financial condition without serious repercussions for the
manufacturer.33
7
g. Summary Judgment
In appropriate cases, judges may determine that the plaintiffs proffer of
evidence with respect to a demand for punitive damages is insufficient to warrant
335. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Propriety of
Ordering Separate Trials as to Liability and Damages, Under Rule 42(b) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in Actions Involving Personal Injwy, Death, or Property Damage, 78 A.L.R.
FED. 890 (1986).
336. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (offering bifurcation as an alternative); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102,
104 (6th Cir. 1975) (indicating that the liability and damages issues had been tried separately);
Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 519, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (dividing the case into
a compensatory damages phase and a punitive damages phase); see also Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1469
(bifurcating exemplary damages and compensatory damages determinations); cf. Simpson v.
Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying a request for bifurcation
when defendant failed to show a need for it).
337. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1994)
(explaining the bifurcation process); In re Breast Implants, 942 F. Supp. 958, 962-63
(E.&S.D.N.Y. 1996) (severing injury issues from damage issues); Puppe v. A.C. and S., Inc.,
733 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (D.N.D. 1990) (establishing procedure for trial precluding any
mention, by the court or counsel, of the punitive damages claim and allowing a separate
proceeding on punitive damages if liability is found); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d
187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984); ENTERPRisE LiABILrrY, supra note 14, at 253; cf Neal, 548 F. Supp.
at 391 (finding that compensatory and punitive issues could be tried together without prejudice
to the manufacturer).
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submission of the issue to the jury at all.338 At the end of discovery, or at some
other appropriate time, the manufacturer's counsel could move for summary
judgment as to all or part of the claims the plaintiff has brought.3 9 Here, Rule
56(c), which courts are relying upon more frequently, allows entry of partial
summary judgment without a trial. 34" Absent evidence which shows that the
manufacturer engaged in conduct that meets the applicable state standard for
awarding punitive damages, the trial court should not submit factually insufficient
claims for punitive damages to the jury.34 ' Likewise, when a manufacturer
attempts to warn consumers and users about the potential dangers of using a
product, a punitive award is not appropriate and the issue should not be sent to
the jury.342
Summary judgment disposes of unwarranted claims for punitive damages
and "prevent[s] wasteful adjudication of issues having no foundation in law or
fact. '343 It is a potent procedural device for relieving defendant manufacturers of
an alleged obligation to pay punitive damages. In fact, since this is a pretrial
motion, when the court grants the motion for summary judgment on the punitive
damages issue, the manufacturer does not have to introduce evidence on that
question at the trial.
338. See Baker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1986)(declining to submit punitive damage issue to the jury because no factual basis was
established); Godwin, 667 A.2d at 139-44 (finding insufficient evidence to present punitive
damages issue to the jury); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (Wis. 1980); see
also Owen, supra note 2, at 36-44 (stating that no punitive damages should be awarded when
the product is not defective and listing other reasons for nonliability).
339. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(b); see also In re Breast Implants, 942 F. Supp. at 961; EDWARD
J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (1994) (calling
summary judgment "the single most important pretrial device used today"); Mark Hansen,
Warning: Don't Flick with Bic, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 22 (reporting that a manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment had been granted).
340. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also BRUNET ET AL., supra note 339, at 13-14. See
generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (setting the burden which the movant
must meet when filing a motion for summary judgment).
341. See Sloman v. Tambrands, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 699, 703 & n.8 (D. Md. 1993) (granting
summary judgment because the manufacturer did not act with "actual malice"); Wangen, 294
N.W.2d at 457.
342. See Toole v. McClintock, 999 F.2d 1430, 1436 (1 th Cir. 1993); Stanback v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 645-46 (4th Cir. 1981) (granting summary judgment because there
was insufficient evidence that the manufacturer's failure to warn about the danger caused
plaintiff's injury); Boddie v. Litton Holding Sys., 455 N.E.2d 142, 151-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(finding that the trial court correctly granted one defendant's motion for summary judgment).
But see In re Breast Implants, 942 F. Supp. at 961 (denying a premature motion for summary
judgment); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding
that summary judgment was inappropriate since corporate employers' "state of mind or motive
or good faith" was involved).
343. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 339, at 4.
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h. Multidistrict Litigation
For limited purposes, a federal statute, the Multidistrict Litigation Act
("MDL'),3" enables courts to transfer all lawsuits that have been filed in different
districts to one designated district. The MDL allows the Federal Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer actions involving "one or more common
questions of fact." '345 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses and [to]
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions," the matters are
transferred for consolidating or coordinating all pretrial proceedings.346 Some
products liability cases have been transferred for these reasons. To illustrate, two
well-known cases were transferred under the MDL. The Judicial Panel transferred
the Agent Orange litigation to Judge Weinstein in a New York district court. 47
The breast implant litigation was transferred to the Honorable Samuel C. Pointer,
Jr. in the Northern District of Alabama for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.348
This is another cost-saving measure for manufacturers. Expenses decrease in
MDL litigation because lengthy pretrial proceedings for several separate cases are
consolidated and coordinated in one forum. Issues affecting potentially large
numbers of claimants are decided at one time instead of in a piecemeal manner
by different judges who may render inconsistent opinions.
i. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Manufacturers may resort to alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") to avoid
an obligation to pay punitive damages. To forgo the trial process entirely,
manufacturers and claimants could dispose of claims through arbitration,
mediation, or some other method of ADR.349 Actually, to sidestep the gamble of
trials and the accompanying high risk of paying punitive awards, most corporate
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1996).
345. Id. § 1407(a).
346. Id. After pretrial proceedings are completed, the cases are sent back to the district from
which they were transferred. See id.
347. See Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 901 F.2d 7, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1990).
348. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 922 (E.D. Mich. 1995); In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (combining cases for
pretrial matters). But see Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers
(In re Dow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting company's challenge to
transfer); Rex Bossert, Breast Implant Suits: A Bankruptcy Matter?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 1997,
at Al (discussing the decision to transfer cases).
349. See King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1028 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting
parties' prior agreement to participate in ADR); see also LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U.
WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 17-22 (1994) (describing the different modes of ADR). See
generally AMERICAN ARBITRATIONASS'N, TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVEDISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND MASS TORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS (1997) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON ADR]
(recommending use of ADR in mass tort cases).
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litigants settle claims.35 During pretrial negotiations, ninety-five percent of the
claims against manufacturers are settled.35'
For manufacturers, ADR is beneficial in even more ways. "[N]eutrals can be
selected to determine fair formulas for allocating fixed amounts of money or to
establish procedures for addressing fairness issues. Settlement agreements can
provide for ADR procedures to address unanticipated issues. 352 Also, ADR is
a less expensive and more expeditious manner of resolving disputes.353 Finally,
ADR permits companies to maintain some privacy regarding their settlements.
To illustrate, as a condition of the settlement, company representatives can, and
do, stipulate that the parties may not disclose or publicize the amount of the
settlement.354
2. Trial Procedures
a. Evidence
Trial judges should exercise their broad discretion in monitoring admission of
evidence.355 For example, evidence should be admitted regarding whether
punitive awards already have been levied against a manufacturer in prior cases.
The defendant manufacturer's wealth is a relevant consideration. Evidence of
postaccident remedial actions that the manufacturer took should be admitted. If
the manufacturer could be penalized further in future proceedings, that evidence
is admissible. In addition, most courts agree that information about past awards
350. See King, 906 F.2d at 1028 n.28 (mentioning that all except one defendant had settled);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 170-74 (2d Cir. 1987)
(approving a $180 million settlement agreement); In re Dow Coming Corp., 198 B.R. 214
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (approving settlement); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d
466, 479-80 (N.J. 1986) (noting that the asbestos industry had established a claims facility for
expeditious settlements); SOBOL, supra note 178, at 22 (mentioning the settlement of 198 cases
against Robins for $38 million); Saks, supra note 13, at 1212, 1227-28; see also ACandS, Inc.
v. Godwin, 667 A.2d 116, 154-55, 158-59 (Md. 1995) (advising the jury that some defendants
settled after the trial started and encouraging judges to set trial dates to expedite settlements);
Don J. DeBenedictis, Implant Settlement Approved, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 34 (announcing
a $4.25 billion settlement and that approximately 14,742 women opted out of the class action);
Sargeant, supra note 102, at 114 (announcing Johns-Manville's settlements); Savage, supra
note 76, at Al (reporting that corporate lawyers "offer generous settlements" to avoid punitive
awards). But see New Zealand Women Will Appeal Implant Settlement, DOMINION POST
(Morgantown, W. Va.), Sept. 16, 1994, at A3 (complaining that they would not receive a fair
share of the money and threatening to prevent all women from recovering anything).
351. Saks, supra note 13, at 1213.
352. TASK FORCE ON ADR, supra note 349, at 11.
353. See DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATiNG LEGAL DISPUTES 524 (1996) (describing mediation
as "the dispute resolution method of choice"). But see King, 906 F.2d at 1028 (noting parties'
failure to cooperate with court-monitored ADR); Godwin, 667 A.2d at 119 (indicating that
judge's ADR techniques had "only limited success").
354. See Saks, supra note 13, at 1242.
355. See e.g., Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223 (Ct. App. 1983).
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and the negative impact that those awards had on the manufacturer's financial
status are relevant and admissible for the trier of fact's consideration. 56
On the other hand, judges should exclude certain evidence that is not relevant
to the issues in the case. For instance, in a case about whether a specific kind of
tire manufactured at a certain plant was defective, evidence revealing a recall of
other kinds of tires and studies of operations at other plants was held
inadmissible.357 Cumulative and prejudicial evidence showing that the defendant
had engaged in improprieties while manufacturing or handling other products may
have negatively influenced the jury to dole out a high verdict for punitive
damages. As a result, the court held that the defendant tire manufacturer's motion
in limine to exclude this type of evidence should have been granted.35
b. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Alternatively, during trial, as permitted by Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the manufacturer may argue a motion for judgment as a matter
of law to prevent submission of the exemplary damages issue to the jury. Rule
50(a) provides that if"a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on
that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party."359 This means that a
judge, viewing the punitive damages evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, may determine that the plaintiff has not provided evidence that satisfies
the local standard for punitive damages. If the judge makes such a finding,
judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages issue should be entered for
356. See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1391 (3d Cir.), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 407 (5th Cir. 1986); Acosta v. Honda
Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1983); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548
F. Supp. 357, 387-88 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (disallowing speculative and vague information but
allowing information about involvement in litigation and possible liability); Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984) (informing the jury that the defendant may be
subject to other awards); Johns-Manville Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding information that either aggravates or mitigates admissible); Spaur v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868 (Iowa 1994); Unified Sch. Dist. No.
490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196,206 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d
1353, 1356 (Me. 1985); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp, 512 A.2d 466, 480 (N.J. 1986)
(considering "evidence of any criminal punishment imposed for the conduct in question");
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 447, 459-60 (Wis. 1980) (evidence of prior
awards admissible); ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 253-55 (advocating
admission of evidence regarding profit defendant realized from misconduct but not evidence
of defendant's wealth); cf Vossler, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (considering wealth only when
making excessiveness determinations).
357. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 461 S.E.2d 877, 886-87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that evidence about another product that lacked similarity to the product in question
should not have been admitted).
358. See id.; cf Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 668-70 (Tex. App. 1991, writ
denied) (finding that papers reflected what the corporation knew and when it received that
knowledge).
359. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
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the defendant manufacturer. 6 An order that the manufacturer is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law would take that issue from the jury and eliminate the
risk that the jury would render a verdict for punitive damages.
c. Jury Instructions
After closing arguments, judges and litigants should ensure that jurors receive
appropriate instructions as guidance during their deliberations. A proper
instruction for punitive damages would apprise the jury of the purposes for
punitive awards, set forth criteria for meting out this type of punishment, clearly
define the degree of reprehensibility that merits such an award, and inform jurors
that imposition of exemplary damages is not mandatory.16' At least one author has
faith in civil jurors' ability to issue a fair verdict: "For more than 200 years,
American juries made up of citizens drawn from the community have meted out
justice in a fair and evenhanded manner, regardless of a parties' wealth or social
standing. 3 62 For manufacturers' protection, with the right instructions, jurors will
award reasonable punitive damages only when it is appropriate.
3. Posttrial Procedures
a. Motions
When jurors do assess punitive awards, they do not have the last word.
Manufacturers who wish to challenge an award have a constitutional right to
judicial review. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,363 the Supreme Court ruled that
360. See, e.g., Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048, 1059 (1 1th Cir. 1994); see
also Jackson, 781 F.2d at 402 n.9; Acosta, 717 F.2d at 831-32 (explaining Rule 50); Knippen
v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding insufficient evidence for a punitive damages award);
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 461 S.E.2d at 884-85 (finding that denial of the motion was
erroneous). But see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1591 (1996) (denying the
posttrial motion to relieve defendant of the obligation to pay punitive damages); Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 109 (6th Cir. 1975) (reversing trial court's order ofjudgment
notwithstanding the jury verdict of $100,000 in punitive damages).
361. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1991) (stating thatjurors
should be informed of the nature, purpose, and basis for exemplary awards); Glasscock v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1097 (5th Cir. 1991) (offering a sample jury instruction);
Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (imploring district
court judges to inform juries of their role by including the Gore factors in the instructions);
Fischer, 512 A.2d at 480-81; Lisa A. Bell, What the Defense Litigator Can Do to Curb
Excessive Punitive Damage Awards, INSIDE LITIG., July 1992, at 17 (offering litigation tips);
Owen, supra note 2, at 21-22 (finding a malice instruction of "willful, intentional and done in
conscious disregard of its possible result" an unacceptable instruction because any person
could be held liable under that standard and it does not consider the risk-benefit analysis). See
generally RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (3d ed.
1997) (providing sample jury instructions and case citations).
362. Stewart, supra note 153, at 71.
363. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
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the State of Oregon's constitution violated the Due Process Clause because it
precluded judicial review of the size of exemplary awards.3" The Court reasoned
that judicial review is critical since "[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of
arbitrary deprivation of property ... [and] judicial review of the amount awarded
was one of the few procedural safeguards which the common law provided
against that danger." '365 The Court based its conclusion that judicial scrutiny was
needed on two grounds. First, jury instructions give jurors unbridled discretion
to determine the size of the award. Second, when they receive evidence of a
corporation's net worth, jurors tend to develop biases against large
corporations.366
There are various ways of seeking judicial review of punitive awards. One way
is to file a motion for judgment as a matter of law. If the manufacturer requested
judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence, under Rule 50(b), it
could renew that motion within ten days after the unfavorable judgment is
entered. At this point, the manufacturer would be asking the trial judge to
overturn a jury verdict for punitive damages. 67
Alternatively, or simultaneously, the defendant may request a new trial. The
trial court may exercise its discretion to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a).368
When ajuror, a party, ajudge, or a witness has committed some error that affects
the punitive damages verdict, a new trial would be proper.3 69 These motions
enable judges to correct juror, party, judicial, or attorney error that has occurred
during trial proceedings.
364. See id. at 418 (finding Oregon law unconstitutional).
365. Id. at 432.
366. See id.; see also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979) (using
judicial scrutiny as a way of dispelling concerns about bankruptcy and excessive punishment),
overruled by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985) (overruling to the extent that
a failure to exercise ordinary care is not sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of
comparative negligence in a products liability case based on strict liability in tort); Owen, supra
note 2, at I I (opining that jurors sympathize with the injured consumer).
367. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b); see Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15, 17-18 (Tex.
App. 1977, no writ) (finding that overturning the exemplary damages verdict was proper).
368. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50, 59; see e.g., Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1242-43
(10th Cir.) (affirming trial court's denial of motion for new trial on the grounds that the jury's
apportionment of fault was not against the weight of the evidence), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2525 (1996); Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048, 1059 (1lth Cir. 1994)
(concluding that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted in the
manufacturer's favor); Sturm, Ruger & Co., 594 P.2d at 47-48 (finding that the trial court
abused its discretion when it did not reduce the punitive damages or order a new trial); cf.
Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 109 (6th Cir. 1975) (concluding that the motion
should not have been granted after the jury verdict was announced). '
369. See Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 599-600
(4th Cir. 1996) (affirming order of new trial on punitive damages issue alone); Hale v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 820 F.2d 928, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1987) (giving plaintiffs the choice
of remittitur or new trial because of the way counsel handled an exhibit); cf. Geressy v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying motion for new trial).
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b. Remittitur
When ajury's punitive award is excessive, the court may give the plaintiff the
option of consenting to a remittitur or undergoing a new trial. Remittitur allows
the judge to subtract any portion of an award that exceeds amounts supported by
evidence presented at trial.370 For example, a district court judge in a
Pennsylvania court reduced a punitive award from $750,000 to $30,000 because
it was excessive. The plaintiff had sustained only $1000 in actual damages.37'
Unlike other procedural tools which remain underutilized by judges, remittitur is
often used when exemplary awards exceed reasonableness standards.372 Remittitur
gives added protection from excessive awards and allows a manufacturer some
reprieve without additional litigation costs and risks associated with another trial
or an appeal.
370. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(b) (West 1997) (allowing the judge to reduce the
award); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(6) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing the judge to reduce or add
to a punitive award); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-87 (1935) (finding remittitur
constitutional and additur unconstitutional); Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1373, 1391 (3d Cir.)
(commending district court for reducing the original award from $25 million to $2 million and
further reducing the district court's award to $1 million), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993);
Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984) (reducing punitive
damage award from $1 million to $300,000); Friedman v. F.E. Myers Co., 710 F. Supp. 118,
124 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (giving plaintiffs a choice of remittitur or a new trial); Alley v. Gubser
Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 38-39 (D. Colo. 1983) (quoting Malandris v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 1981)), rev'd on other grounds, 785
F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1986); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. H.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515
F. Supp. 64, 103 (D.S.C. 1979) (remitting $26,413.34 of the compensatory damage award),
aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So. 2d 1018, 1035
(Ala. 1994) (ordering plaintiff to accept a remittitur of compensatory damages or the case
would be remanded for a new trial); Sturm, Ruger & Co., 594 P.2d at 48-49; Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing trial court's decision reducing $125
million punitive damages award to $3.5 million); Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co.,
435 N.E.2d 729, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (reducing $7.5 million award to $65,000), rev'd on
other grounds, 464 N.E.2d 1011 (Ill. 1984); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466,
480 (N.J. 1986) (noting that "judicious exercise of remittitur" offers protection against
excessive punitive damages). But see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1603
(1996) (holding that when the ratio is in a constitutionally acceptable range, remittitur will not
be an appropriate remedy); State ex. rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Or. 1980)
(suggesting remittitur as an alternative); Saks, supra note 14, at 1280-81 (finding that the larger
the award was, the larger the reduction); Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Excessiveness or
Inadequacy of Punitive Damages in Cases Not Involving Personal Injury or Death, 14
A.L.R.5th 242 (1993) (indicating court's unwillingness to interfere with jury verdicts); Mark
Thompson, Jockeying for Position, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 66 (discussing whether caps on
punitive damages interfere with the prerogatives of the jury, violating the Illinois constitution).
371. See Friedman, 710 F. Supp. at 122-24; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, No.
1920324, 1997 WL 233910, at *8 (Ala. May 9, 1997).
372. See Rustad, supra note 12, at 51.
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c. Appeals
If all other procedures fail, appellate review affords additional scrutiny to
determine whether an award "is ... reasonable in [its] amount and rational in
light of [its] purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition." 373
Thus, "bad decisions can be reversed and ... there is no need for extreme
legislation, like the kinds being proposed in Congress to limit awards.1 374 A
significant number of appeals of punitive awards yielded favorable results.
Defendants appealed more than fifty percent of punitive awards. Appellate courts
reduced or reversed more than half of that fifty percent.
3 75
To guard against awards that are not supported by the evidence, litigants and
judges involved in product liability litigation have utilized some of the options
discussed in this section. If these procedural tools were used more often and more
aggressively, further tort reform would be unnecessarily cumulative. With proper
judicial supervision, either before, during, or after the trial, reasonable awards
that serve the objectives of punitive damages will be assessed. 76 Manufacturers
who conceal their misconduct should not leave the courthouse with a slap on the
wrist and a strong reprimand. However, as they should with any party who
appears before them, members of the judiciary should consider different ways to
protect manufacturers from some of the pitfalls associated with punitive damages.
B. Legislators Have Established Strict Dominion over
Punitive Awards
Most courts have taken a hands-off approach and left tort reform to state and
federal legislators. In doing so, the courts defer to the legislative branch of
373. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991); see also Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) (defining the appropriate
standards of review for district courts and courts of appeals); Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp.,
33 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating the standards of review for district and appellate
courts); Dunn, I F.3d at 1385 (reviewing an award of punitive damages); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (identifying protection that exists
at appellate and district court levels); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d
1100, 1127 (Conn. 1989) (outlining procedural and substantive safeguards against excessive
punitive damage awards); Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 866-68
(Iowa 1994) (describing postverdict scrutiny and upholding the award).
374. Smith, supra note 76, at 3A.
375. See Rustad, supra note 12, at 57; see, e.g., Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1604 (ruling that an
award that was "tantamount to a severe criminal penalty" was inappropriate); Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 594 P.2d at 49 (finding that the award was disproportionate to actual damages and that the
manufacturer was wrong); Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711 (Ct. App.
1976) (reversing an award of punitive damages because ofjudicial error); American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. BIC Corp., 880 P.2d 420, 426 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (finding remittitur of more
than $2 million dollars for each claimant appropriate). But see Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming punitive award of twenty times
compensatory damages and refusing to "upset the jury's verdict").
376. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984).
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government to deal with controlling verdicts.377 In a majority of states, several
laws already are enforced to protect manufacturers from ramifications discussed
in Part IV of this Article. While most statutes address use of procedural
techniques which precede the verdict, some are designed to limit the size of an
award after the jury reaches its verdict.
1. State Legislators
To curtail the devastating impact of punitive damages, some legislators have
introduced and passed legislation that places a ceiling on punitive awards. Many
states including Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri,
Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia use mathematical calculations to
cap these awards. Accordingly, the maximum punitive award is limited to some
amount that is proportionate to the plaintiff s actual or compensatory damages.
For instance, depending upon the location of the forum, the punitive award may
be capped at two, three, or four times the compensatory award." 8
377. See Dunn, I F.3d at 1387 (deferring to Congress or the Virgin Islands' legislature);
Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1989) (deferring to Congress or some
higher judicial authority); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 406 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding state or federal legislative relief more appropriate); Cathey v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1569-70 (2d Cir. 1985); Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 (D.N.J. 1990); Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461,
1466-67 (D. Haw. 1989); Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 866 (doubting whether legislation would halt
the problem of punitive awards); Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 565-66 (W. Va.
1992); ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 263 (advocating federal legislation for
more uniform relief); RICHARD L. BLATT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.6 n.62 (1991) (predicting
that the "battle" over punitive damages, will shift from the courts to the state legislature);
Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 859, 914 (1991) (advocating legislation as the more appropriate remedy); cf Juzwin
v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1065 (D.N.J.) (dictating what the statute must
indicate regarding whether punitive damages should be allowed in mass tort cases and setting
explicit standards), vacated in part on reconsideration, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989);
Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1360-63 (Me. 1985) (establishing standard for determing
punitive damages and burden of proof).
378. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(l)(a), (3) (West 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (limiting award to twice the compensatory damages in
product liability cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West 1997) (limiting punitive awards
to three times compensatory damage); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994) (setting the cap
at the defendant's annual gross income or $5 million, whichever is the lesser amount, or one-
and-one-half times the profit the manufacturer accrued); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (West
Supp. 1997) (allowing posttrial hearing on crediting defendant for prior punitive awards arising
out of same conduct); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (Michie 1996) (establishing cap
based upon the amount of compensatory damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32.03.2-11(4) (1996);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(C) (West Supp. 1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.925(3) (Supp.
1996); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.008 (West Supp. 1997) (limiting
punitive awards to four times actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater); VA. CODE
ANN. § 801-38.1 (Michie 1996). But see DOBBS, supra note 272, at 349-50 (asserting that caps
raise issues of constitutionality and construction); Stewart, supra note 153, at 68 (calling
damage caps "arbitrary and capricious").
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In other states, the plaintiff does not receive the entire exemplary award. A
percentage of each award is allocated to a designated government agency or a
compensation fund.379 In Iowa, for example, the state disburses twenty-five
percent of a punitive award to the plaintiff, deducts litigation costs, then deposits
the remainder in civil reparations trusts. Money from the trusts may be disbursed
"only for . . . indigent civil litigation programs or insurance assistance
programs. 3  Plaintiffs may decry the automatic award reductions, but courts in
Florida, Georgia, and Iowa have upheld these statutes as constitutional.38'
Another way of reducing the risk that jurors will render an excessive verdict is
to prevent jurors from determining the amount of damages. Thus, in some states,
upon receiving a verdict for punitive damages, the court itself is charged with
setting the monetary amount. In Connecticut and Kansas, judges calculate the sum
of exemplary damages that defendants must pay.3 2 Other states allow the court
to hold two separate proceedings. One proceeding involves the manufacturers'
liability for the plaintiffs' injuries. If they are found liable, the same fact finders
would determine whether the complainants are entitled to punitive damages.3 3
Bifurcation avoids prejudice to the manufacturers because evidence about their
379. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West 1997) (allocating 35% of the award to the
General Revenue Fund or Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1997) (paying 75% of punitive awards to the Office of Treasury and Fiscal
Services, less litigation costs and attorneys' fees); 735 ILL. COM. STAT. 5/2-1207 (West Supp.
1997); IOWA CODEANN. § 668A.l(2)(b) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1994);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (West Supp. 1997) (paying attorneys' fees and expenses, then
apportioning 50% of the remainder to the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1996) (allocating half of the amount that exceeds $20,000 to the state
treasury).
380. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. I (2)(b).
381. See Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1035-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), a fd, 68 So.
2d 8 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 637-39 (Ga. 1993); Shepherd
Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa
1991).
382. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(b)
(1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B) (Anderson Supp. 1996); see also ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY, supra note 14, at 256 (suggesting that judges impose the award); cf. Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 401-02 (Ohio 1994) (holding that allowing judges to
make the decision violates the right to jury trial). cf Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 994 (Kan.
1993) (deciding that the judicial determination was not unconstitutional).
383. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring bifurcation upon
defendant's request); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1) (Supp. 1996) (trying liability first
whenever punitive award is sought); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a)-(b) (1994) (giving the
court authority to determine the amount after the trier of fact determines liability); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 549.20(4) (West Supp. 1997) (mandating separate proceedings if either party requests
it); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(1) (West Supp. 1997) (mandating bifurcation upon either
party's request); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (1995) (authorizing jurors to determine
the amount of the punitive award in a separate proceeding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(b),
(d) (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(2) (1996); cf KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.186(1) (Michie 1996) (determining all issues concurrently).
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finances and the seriousness of their misconduct is inadmissible in the liability
phase of the trial. 84
Another measure that states frequently use to control punitive awards is
application of a more stringent standard of evidentiary proof for punitive damages
claims. Rather than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the claimant must
prove entitlement to punitive damages by a higher standard, that is, by clear and
convincing evidence." 5 The clear-and-convincing standard "reduce[s] the risk
that the defendant's reputation will be tarnished erroneously." 3 6 Other courts
have decided that a higher standard is needed because, as a remedy, punitive
damages are extraordinary and harsh. 7
Some state legislatures make it even more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
punitive awards. In Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington,
exemplary awards are not allowed in tort actions, or any other actions, unless an
express statutory provision allows such awards." In comparison, punitive
damages have been banned completely in Nebraska. 89
The statutory provisions discussed in this Part were enacted to diminish and
regulate punitive damage awards. Often, those objectives are fulfilled. "Since the
primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant and deter similar
384. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.263(2) (West Supp.
1997).
385. See BLATT, supra note 377, § 2.6 n.62; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9-17.020 (Michie
1996); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(b) (West
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(l)(a) (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODEANN. § 11-1-65(l)(a) (Supp.
1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 9.1(B) (West Supp. 1996); see also Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir.
1983); Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1465 (D. Haw. 1989); Tuttle v. Raymond,
494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985) (heightening the standard in Maine from a preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard to a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard); Rodriguez v. Suzuki
Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110-11 (Mo. 1996) (changing the standard of proof);
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 264; cf Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950
F. Supp. 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying a preponderance standard "since the substantive
standard for punitive damages is already so high").
386. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
387. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 936 S.W.2d at 110.
388. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 93 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (denying punitive
damages in slander and libel actions); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997); Philippe v.
Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151, 157 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (recovering punitive damages
only when there is a specific provision allowing recovery), affd, 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980);
Fisher Properties, Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986); Barr v. Interbay
Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441, 443 (Wash. 1981), modified, 649 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1982); see
also Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of
Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 955 n.94
(1989). But cf Froud v. Celotex Corp., 437 N.E.2d 910, 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (Sullivan, J.,
specially concurring) (noting that Massachusetts, Washington, Louisiana, and Nebraska
disallow punitive damages, and that England only allows them in specific circumstances), revd
on other grounds, 456 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1983).
389. See Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975).
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wrongdoing in the future, the 'sword' must be used to deter the wrongdoer, not
kill him."39
2. Federal Legislators
Every year since 1976, congressional attempts at establishing uniform
constraints on punitive damages in product liability cases have failed.39' On May
2, 1996, President William Clinton vetoed the Common Sense Product Liability
Legal Reform Act of 1996."9 The focus of the 1996 legislation was upon capping
punitive awards and establishing uniform state laws regarding punitive
damages.393 To accomplish those goals, several proposals were made. The
proposed burden of proof was clear-and-convincing evidence "that conduct
carried out by the defendant with a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights
or safety of others" caused the claimant's injuries.394 Factors that would be
considered in assessing awards included concealment of misconduct.395 Also, the
bill proposed a $250,000 cap on punitive awards or the plaintiff could receive
twice the sum of the award for economic and noneconomic damages, whichever
was greater.396 An additional amount could be added for egregious misconduct.
397
If the corporation's conduct caused a person's death, the cap would not apply at
all. 39
8
When he vetoed the bill, President Clinton referred to the traditional principle
that state legislators had the authority to decide which conduct is punishable and
how awards should be calculated. So, the president concluded that Congress'
proposed legislation improperly usurped the province of state legislators.
Furthermore, the president opposed the limit on punitive damages because
"arbitrary ceilings .. .endanger the safety of the public. Capping punitive
damages undermines their very purpose, which is to punish and thereby deter
egregious misconduct .... There is nothing common sense about such reforms
390. Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 517 (Okla. 1983).
391. See Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Product Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 247 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (noting that
manufacturers, sellers, and insurers had lobbied for legislation to limit their liability); see also
Rustad, supra note 12, at 10-12 (discussing unsuccessful efforts to legislate uniform product
liability laws). For a Senate history of attempts to reform products liability, see 142 CONG. REc.
S2300-01 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996).
392. See Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives of the
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
780 (May 2, 1996) [hereinafter Veto Message].
393. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. § 102(a)(1) (1995).
394. See id. § 108(a).
395. See id. § 108(b)(3)(B)(v).
396. See id § 108(b)(1)(A)-(B). Businesses with fewer than 25 employees, and individuals
with a net worth of $500,000 or less potentially would be liable for a lower award-$250,000
or twice the plaintiffs compensatory damages, whichever was the lesser amount. See id. §
108(b)(2).
397. See id. § 108(b)(3).
398. See id. § 109.
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to product liability law. ' 99 Efforts to override the President's veto failed on May
9, 1996.400
Members of Congress are unrelenting in their attempts to reform product
liability law. On January 21, 1997, Senator John Ashcroft, a Republican from
Missouri, introduced the Product Liability Reform Act of 1997,01 some of whose
provisions are very similar to sections in the Common Sense Product Liability
Legal Reform Act. For example, the proposed cap of $250,000 or two times
noneconomic or economic damages is the same.4 2 Also, plaintiffs must show "a
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of others" by clear and
convincing evidence.40 3 Current or subsequent concealment is still one among
several factors. 4" Because the new bill is so similar to the Common Sense
Product Liability Legal Reform Act that President Clinton vetoed just months
before the most recent bill was introduced, it is highly improbable that he will
sign it.
CONCLUSION
The threat of multiple and substantial punitive awards remains necessary to
promote public safety by deterring bad acts by manufacturers.4 5 "While punitive
damages may not be a logically perfect method of remedying.., unavoidable
flaws in our system ofjustice, they are a useful surrogate." 4" The kind of flagrant
and reprehensible misconduct that the Gore Court described still abounds in the
business world. Moreover, administrative and criminal remedies that should be
useful deterrents are woefully inadequate to protect consumers. Thus, punitive
damages play a vital role in punishing some manufacturers and deterring others
from endangering consumers and users.
Manufacturers who hunger for a competitive edge on the market and large
monetary profits have turned a blind eye to the human suffering, deaths, and other
destruction that their products have caused. Their actions are in complete
disregard for human safety and they must be held accountable without arbitrary
limits on punitive awards. Accordingly, on a case-by-case basis, punitive damages
should be awarded as often as necessary and in amounts large enough to
encourage manufacturers to take better care in designing, producing, and
marketing products.
399. Veto Message, supra note 392, at 780-81.
400. See 142 CoNG. REC. H4756-04 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (reporting legislative failure to
override the presidential veto, 258 votes in favor of overriding to 163 votes against and 13
abstentees).
401. The Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. (1997); see 143 CONG.
REC. S158 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997); see also Rhonda McMillion, Seeking Cures for a Veto,
A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 102 (discussing Congress's attempt to draft another bill that President
Clinton would sign).
402. See S. 5 § 108(b).
403. Id. § 108(a).
404. See id. § 108(3)(B)(v).
405. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452-53 (Wis. 1980).
406. Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 837 (3d Cir. 1983).
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One woman who testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Science and
Transportation said:
In your perfect world, manufacturers would not change the results of their
own product research. They would spend some time and money tracking their
own medical devices, and issue recalls when it becomes obvious that one of
their products is threatening consumer health and safety....
But in the real world, product liability and punitive damages are the
motivators that send the designers back to the drawing board."0 7
In our imperfect world-the real world-manufacturers engage in cover-ups, lies,
and concealment of information about their hazardous products. Consequently,
innocent consumers and users are maimed and killed. Without the threat of
punitive damages, the maiming and killing will continue. "The doctrine which
allows a jury to award exemplary damages to the sufferer by wrongful acts which
the public is strongly interested to punish... furnishes the most efficient, if not
the only, means of correcting many very serious social abuses. 408
407. , 565, The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transp., 104th Cong. 215 (1995) (testimony of Gail Armstrong, Founder and Director of the
National Breast Implant Coalition).
408. Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N.H. 304, 320 (1869).
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